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Antitrust violations traditionally have been viewed as statu-
tory torts,' yet tort principles of damage allocation, including con-
tribution2 and claim reduction,3 have not been extended by anal-
1. Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 694 F.2d 466, 473 (7th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d 380, 391
(4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983); Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, Contribu-
tion Among Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J.L. & EcoN. 331
(1980); Schwartz, Simpson & Arnold, Contribution in Private Actions Under the Federal
Antitrust Laws, 33 Sw. L.J. 779, 790-91 (1979); see Rose, Contribution in Antitrust: Some
Policy Considerations, 48 ANTITRUST L.J. 1605, 1607 (1979) (arguing tort law contribution
experience should to serve as a guide in considering the issue of contribution in the antitrust
context).
2. Contribution is the right of a jointly liable defendant who has paid a judgment to
assert a claim against other jointly liable persons to recover their fair shares of liability.
Contribution and Claim Reduction in Antitrust Litigation, ABA SEc. ANTITRUST L. MONO-
1278 [Vol. 40:1277
1987] ANTITRUST REFORM 1279
ogy in the federal courts to antitrust cases. Moreover, the principle
of joint and several liability, made applicable to antitrust conspira-
tors by judicial fiat4 some eighty years ago, has gone largely un-
challenged. While the federal antitrust laws are nearly a century
old, the damage allocation debate is of recent vintage,5 emerging in
the wake of the Electrical Equipment Cases,6 when the private
treble damage remedy came into its own.7
The recent emergence of contribution and claim reduction as
issues is not surprising. Scholarly debate in the antitrust field his-
torically has involved liability issues and did not focus seriously on
remedies until the 1970s.1 The catalysts for the current debate are:
first, the seeming anomaly of a no-contribution rule in light of the
acceptance of damage allocation principles; 9 and second, the per-
ceived unfairness of making relatively minor actors in a conspirato-
rial scheme solely liable for amounts that are disproportionate to
the degree of wrongdoing. 10
GRAPH No. 11, at 4-5 (1986) [hereinafter ABA Contribution Monograph]; see also Schwartz,
Simpson & Arnold, supra note 1, at 780.
3. Claim reduction serves to reduce the liability of jointly liable defendants by the
fair share of damages attributable to jointly liable settling defendants regardless of the ac-
tual settlement amount. ABA Contribution Monograph, supra note 2, at 5; Polinsky &
Shavell, Contribution and Claim Reduction Among Antitrust Defendants: An Economic
Analysis, 33 STAN. L. REV. 447, 448 (1981).
4. City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works, 127 F. 23 (6th Cir. 1903),
afl'd, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
5. In 1969 a district court considered and explicitly rejected an antitrust defendant's
claim that it was entitled to contribution. Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President
Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). As early as 1960, however, one federal appel-
late court had held that no right of contribution existed under federal common law among
antitrust defendants. See Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1960).
6. The Electrical Equipment Cases refer to some 2233 private cases brought between
1962 and 1966 against Westinghouse, General Electric, and Allis-Chalmers. Posner, A Sta-
tistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 371 (1970).
7. Although the antitrust laws originally provided~a private treble damage remedy,
the private action was not a potent enforcement weapon until the Electrical Equipment
Cases. In the last 25 years, private actions have become the "bulwark of antitrust enforce-
ment." Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
8. Breit & Elzinga, Private Antitrust Enforcement: The New Learning, 28 J.L. &
ECON. 405 (1985).
9. See, e.g., UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT §§ 1-9, 12 U.L.A. 63 (1975);
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(f) (1982); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78i(e), 78r(b) (1982).
10. See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 659 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1982); Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 649 F.2d
1370 (10th Cir. 1979). See generally STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON MONOPOLIES AND COMMERCIAL
LAW OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 97th CONG., 2d SESS., REPORT ON PROPOSED
LEGISLATION To ALLOCATE DAMAGES AMONG DEFENDANTS IN PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION
1-2, reprinted in 44 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 280 (Feb. 10, 1983) [hereinafter
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Recently the contest has shifted from the judicial arena to the
legislative arena. In Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials,
Inc." the Supreme Court held that conspiring codefendants have
neither a statutory nor a common-law right of contribution in anti-
trust cases. The Court also has declined to review lower court rul-
ings denying claim reduction. 12 Rather than ending the debate,
however, these decisions have only added fuel to the fire, in part
because of then Chief Justice Burger's suggestion that contribution
is a matter for Congress, not the courts. 3 The focus of the contro-
versy thus has shifted from what "is" to what "ought to be."
Much has been written on contribution and claim reduction in
antitrust cases as well as related proposals for damages alloca-
tion, 4 but no consensus among scholars has emerged. The theoret-
ical studies on contribution and claim reduction15 have been some-
what illuminating, but their value is limited because conclusions on
the desirability of damage reduction vary, depending on the as-
sumptions one accepts in analyzing specific fact situations. More-
over, the assumptions themselves are questionable, for the extent
to which they mirror reality is far from clear.
A consensus has not emerged among legislators either. Unfor-
tunately, the congressional debates regarding the merits and de-
merits of contribution and claim reduction have been obscured by
HOUSE STAFF REPORT].
11. 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
12. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983) (declining to review lower court's refusal to allow claim
reduction).
13. 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
14. See ABA Contribution Monograph, supra note 2; Cirace, A Game Theoretic Anal-
ysis of Contribution and Claim Reduction in Antitrust Treble Damage Suits, 55 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 42 (1980); Corbett, Apportionment of Damages and Contribution Among Cocon-
spirators in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 31 FORDHAM L. REV. 111 (1962); Easterbrook,
Landes & Posner, supra note 1; Jacobsen, Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants: A
Necessary Solution to a Recurring Problem, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 217 (1980); Polden & Sulli-
van, Contribution and Claim Reduction in Antitrust Litigation: A Legislative Analysis, 20
HARV. J. ON LEGis. 397 (1983); Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3; Rose, supra note 1;
Schwartz, Simpson & Arnold, supra note 1; Sullivan, New Perspectives in Antitrust Litiga-
tion: Towards a Right of Comparative Contribution, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 389; Note, Contribu-
tion in Private Antitrust Suits, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 682 (1978) [hereinafter Note, Private
Suits]; Note, Contribution Among Antitrust Co-Conspirators, 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 749
(1980); Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust Actions, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1540 (1980); Note,
Contribution and Antitrust Policy, 78 MicH. L. REV. 890 (1980); Note, A Case Against Con-
tribution in Antitrust, 58 TEx. L. REV. 961 (1980); Note, Contribution for Antitrust Code-
fendants, 66 VA. L. REV. 797 (1980); Recent Development, Contribution Among Antitrust
Defendants, 33 VAND. L. REV. 979 (1980).
15. Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, supra note 1; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3.
1280 [Vol. 40:1277
ANTITRUST REFORM
self-interest.1" During 1982, bills providing for contribution and
claim reduction were considered while major antitrust cases were
pending, and lobbyists seeking to obtain relief from potentially
enormous treble damage judgments besieged Congress. 17 Recently,
Congress has considered more modest damage allocation reform
proposals-abolition of joint and several liability' s and claim
reduction without contribution. 9 Congress also is considering an
antitrust remedies reform package that includes provisions calling
for detrebling for most antitrust violations2 ° and claim reduction in
all antitrust cases.2' While the debates continue, troublesome ques-
tions about the existing system of antitrust damage allocation
remain.
Perhaps the ongoing debate's most significant shortcoming is
that contribution and claim reduction generally have been viewed
in isolation and not in the context of an overall reshaping of pri-
vate antitrust remedies. Most scholars and attorneys, for example,
have analyzed the issue of damage reduction assuming the contin-
ued presence of mandatory treble damages when, in fact, Congress
and some authors have proposed eliminating mandatory treble
damages.2" Nor has there been sufficient study of the implications
of the abolition of joint and several liability on contribution.3 A
broader view of antitrust remedies is necessary if the merits of the
16. In 1982 the Senate considered Senate Bill 995 and seemed favorably disposed to
the contribution measures embodied in that bill. The legislation lost its support largely be-
cause of the persistent efforts of certain firms to apply its provisions to pending cases. Over
200 firms contributed to the campaign, many of whom had a direct stake in the outcome.
Among the most active advocates of a retroactivity provision were Georgia-Pacific,
Weyerhauser, Willamette, Mead, and Milliken. Senate Refuses to Invoke Cloture to End
Debate on Contribution Bill, 43 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1093, at 1055 (Dec.
9, 1982).
17. See infra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
18. S. 1300, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
19. S. 539, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1155, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S.
2162, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
20. S. 539, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1155, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
21. S. 539, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1155, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
22. See S. 539, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1155, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987);
Cavanagh, Detrebling Antitrust Damages: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 61 TUL. L. REV.
777, 848 (1987) (stating that "any change in the damage multiplier should be made only
after taking into account other possible changes in the law of antitrust remedies. Elimina-
tion of trebling combined with the introduction of contribution and/or claim reduction or
with abolition of joint and several liability may severely hamper private enforcement
efforts").
23. Abolition of joint and several liability generally has been viewed as an alternative
to contribution. See Moore, Two Lawyers Put New Wine in Contribution Bottle, Legal
Times, May 6, 1985, at 2, col. 1.
1987] 1281
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Reagan Administration's legislative proposals are to be judged
properly.
This Article analyzes the desirability of contribution, claim re-
duction, and the abolition of joint and several liability in the con-
text of other reform proposals, including detrebling of damages in
private actions and the abolition of the private remedy. The Arti-
cle concludes that: (1) although the current law denying contribu-
tion and claim reduction may give antitrust plaintiffs unfair lever-
age and from time to time produce harsh results, the resulting
inequities are neither so widespread nor of such a magnitude to
require a rule of contribution with or without claim reduction; (2)
the inequities of the present system are better addressed through
selective detrebling of antitrust damages combined with a limita-
tion on joint and several liability for marginal participants in the
conspiracy to prevent unfairly disproportionate liability; (3) claim
reduction is preferable to contribution if mandatory treble dam-
ages are retained; and (4) joint and several liability for antitrust
conspirators ought not to be abolished except to the extent neces-
sary to prevent marginal defendants from facing extraordinary
liability.
II. ORIGINS OF THE DEBATE
A. The Distinctive Features of Private Treble Damages
Actions Under the Antitrust Laws
The current state of the law denying contribution and claim
reduction to antitrust defendants should be of concern because
several features of antitrust damage law may expose conspiring de-
fendants to damages that are far in excess of the actual benefits
they derive from their individual wrongdoing. First, under section
four of the Clayton Act,24 -antitrust judgments automatically are
trebled by the court. Unquestionably, wrongdoers ought to com-
pensate victims for actual damages inflicted; the penal portion of a
treble damages judgment, however, bears no necessary relationship
to the victim's harm or the perpetrators' benefits and may drive
the wrongdoer out of business. 5 Today, it is not unusual for actual
24. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
25. Individual Treble Damage Liability: Hearings on S. 1300 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 31-32 (1985) [hereinafter ITDR Hearings]




damages to approach one billion dollars 26-damage judgments of
far less could cripple many firms.
Second, in antitrust conspiracy cases, defendants are jointly
and severally liable to the plaintiffs.17 To satisfy a judgment, plain-
tiffs may proceed against one, some, or all of the defendants.8
Hence, it is possible that a deep-pocket defendant, who had only
peripheral involvement in the conspiracy or reaped only minor
benefits, might be held liable for all of a treble damages judgment.
Moreover, because defendants have no right of contribution, the
most culpable actors may escape with only token liability. There is
also no right to claim reduction when codefendants settle prior to
judgment.29 Any settlement amounts paid are subtracted from the
treble damage award, rather than the amount of actual damages.30
To the extent that a defendant has settled for less than its fair
share of liability, nonsettling defendants face liability for a portion
of damages inflicted by the settling party.3 1
Third, many antitrust suits are brought as nationwide class ac-
tions. 2 Obviously, defendants' monetary exposure increases signifi-
cantly when there are many victims. Fourth, victorious plaintiffs
are entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees under section four
of the Clayton Act,33 while successful defendants may not seek at-
torneys' fees under the antitrust laws.34 Fifth, statutory tolling pro-
26. See Antitrust Damage Allocation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies
and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 141
(1981-82) [hereinafter House Damage Hearings] (prepared statement of Robert P. Taylor,
an attorney with the San Francisco firm of Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro).
27. Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 397 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835
(1957); City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works, 127 F. 23 (6th Cir. 1903),
aff'd, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
28. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TORTS §§ 47, 48 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
29. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d 380, 391-92 (4th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983).
30. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 348 (1971); Flintkote
Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 397 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
31. See infra note 69.
32. ITDR Hearings, supra note 25, at 30-31 (prepared statement of Ira M. Milistein).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
34. This is not to say that a prevailing defendant may never recover attorneys' fees in
an antitrust suit. Sanctions imposed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 for
filing frivolous claims frequently involve the award of attorneys' fees to the prevailing de-
fendant. See Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1271 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that "sanc-
tions for misconduct and abuse of the legal system seem to be inevitably interwoven with
the problems of shifting the burden of attorneys' fees, which have become the primary cost
factor in litigation"). Attorneys' fees also may be shifted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 if an
attorney multiplies the proceedings "unreasonably and vexatiously." Finally, fees may be
1987] 1283
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visionss and the doctrine of fraudulent concealment 6 serve to ex-
tend the periods over which damages may be recovered. Finally,
once a statutory violation and antitrust injury are established, the
plaintiffs face a relatively lenient standard of proof in establishing
the amount of damages. The award of damages may be based on
just and reasonable estimates, including both "probable and infer-
ential, as well as direct and positive proof.
'37
The combination of these factors-mandatory treble damages,
joint and several liability, absence of contribution and claim reduc-
tion, class actions, prevailing plaintiffs' right to attorneys' fees,
tolling of the statute of limitations, and lenient standards of
proof-has had the unintended consequence of magnifying the po-
tential damage exposure of any individual defendant .3  These fac-
tors also provide plaintiffs with significant leverage in litigating an-
titrust claims, while at the same time making the defense of the
lawsuit a risky venture. Defendants frequently face a Hobson's
choice: either pay some amount to settle, even though they believe
in their innocence, or try the matter and risk uncapped liability.
For many firms, the risk of a catastrophic judgment is unaccept-
ably high, and they choose to settle, regardless of their
culpability."'
If one views the present system as favoring plaintiffs, then
permitting contribution, with or without claim reduction, would be
one way of alleviating the imbalance. The question that must be
addressed is whether either or both contribution and claim reduc-
tion are appropriate means to correct this perceived imbalance.
shifted pursuant to the court's inherent equitable power if plaintiff files or maintains the
action in bad faith. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765-66 (1980).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1982). The normal statute of limitations in private actions is
four years. 15 U.S.C. § 15(b). Nevertheless, the statute for private actions is tolled during
the pendency of a government action, and to bring a suit, private plaintiffs must file within
one year following the termination of a prior government proceeding.
36. The elements of fraudulent concealment include: (1) wrongful concealment by de-
fendants; (2) failure of plaintiff to discover factual grounds for antitrust claims; and (3) due
diligence by the plaintiff. ABA Contribution Monograph, supra note 2, at 10-11 (citing In re
Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1169 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905
(1980)).
37. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946) (quoting Allison v.
Chandler, 11 Mich. 542, 555 (1863)); Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper
Co., 282 U.S. 555, 561-64 (1931); see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395
U.S. 100, 123-25 (1969).
38. ITDR Hearings, supra note 25, at 31-32 (prepared statement of Ira M. Millstein).
Millstein, Birrell & Kessler, S. 1300-H.R. 4831-An Overdue Antitrust Reform, 31 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 955, 958-61 (1986).
39. Millstein, Birrell & Kessler, supra note 38, at 958-61.
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B. Historical Development of the Law on Contribution
The history of the law on contribution among joint tortfeasors
is shrouded in confusion. Based on the English case of Mer-
ryweather v. Nixan,4 0 the common law did not give joint
tortfeasors the right to contribution.41 Merryweather, however, in-
volved an intentional tort, and the narrow holding of the case is
that contribution is not permitted in cases involving intentional
misconduct.42 Indeed, authority predating Merryweather indicates
that contribution is permissible if the joint conduct was merely
negligent.4 3 Nevertheless, the later English cases, by denying con-
tribution among joint tortfeasors despite the absence of intentional
wrongdoing, either erroneously construed Merryweather or broad-
ened its holding.44 American cases adopted this broad rule against
contribution, and by the twentieth century the rule had become
firmly entrenched in the United States.
45
Great Britain abrogated the common-law bar to contribution
among joint tortfeasors by statute in 1935.46 During the same pe-
riod, American scholars criticized the rule denying contribution
among joint tortfeasors as unduly harsh,47 and legislatures and
courts began to examine the reasons for banning contribution. In
1939 the Commissioners on Uniform Laws adopted the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act,48 which galvanized state leg-
islatures into action. Today, thirty-five states have statutes al-
lowing contribution;4 9 five states, as well as the District of Colum-
40. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
41. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 28, § 50; Rose, supra note 1, at 1605.
42. Rose, supra note 1, at 1607.
43. Id. at 1606-07 & n.13.
44. Id. at 1605-07.
45. Id. at 1605; ABA Contribution Monograph, supra note 2, at 6.
46. The Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 25 & 26 Geo. 5, ch. 30, §
6(1)(c) (1935).
47. See, e.g., Gregory, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Uniform Practice,
1938 Wis. L. REV. 365; Gregory, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Defense, 54 HARv.
L. REV. 1170 (1941).
48. UNI. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT §§ 1-9, 12 U.L.A- 63 (1975).
49. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.16.010 to .16.060 (1983); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2501
to -2509 (Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1001 to -1009 (1962); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§
875-883 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-50.5-101 to -106 (Supp. 1986);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6301-6308 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31 (West 1986); GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-12-32 (1984); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 663-11 to -17 (1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-803 to
-806 (1979 & Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2413 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. §8 412.010 to
.050 (Michie 1972); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1805 (West 1987); MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-
24 (1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231B, §§ 1-4 (West 1986); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§
600.2925a to .2925d (West 1986); Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-5-5 (1972); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.060
12851987]
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bia and the Virgin Islands, have court decisions permitting
contribution.5 0 In the federal system there also has been a similar
trend toward contribution. Contribution is expressly permitted
under the Securities Act of 193351 and the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934.52 Moreover, the federal courts in recent years have
permitted contribution in cases involving admiralty,53 aviation col-
lisions,5 employment discrimination,5 FELA claims,56 and securi-
ties fraud.
57
The federal courts did not directly confront the issue of con-
tribution in antitrust cases until 1969. 58 Following that decision,
other lower courts, with one notable exception,5 9 also held that de-
fendants had no right of contribution under the antitrust laws.60
The Supreme Court's decision in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff
Materials, Inc.6 1 ended the debate as to whether a right of contri-
(1983); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 17.223 to .305 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-1 to :53A-5
(West 1952); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-3-1 to -8 (1978); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 1401-1404
(McKinney 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1B-1 to -7 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-38-01 to -04
(1976 & Supp. 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.31, 2307.32 (Anderson 1981); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 832 (West Supp. 1987); OR REv. STAT. §§ 18.440 to -.460 (1983); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 42, §§ 8321-8327 (Purdon 1982); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-6-1 to -11 (1985); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS ANN. §§ 15-8-11 to -22 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-11-101 to -106 (1980); VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-34, 8.01-35.1 (1984); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-13 (1981); Wis. STAT. §§ 113.01
to .11 (1985); Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-1-110 to -113 (1977).
50. Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437
(1977), cert. denied sub nom. Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach.
Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978); Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1967); Knell v. Feltman,
174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956); Bedell v.
Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963); Underwriters at Lloyds v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388,
208 N.W. 13 (1926); Royal Indem. Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 193 Neb. 752, 229
N.W.2d 183 (1975).
51. 15 U.S.C. § 77(k)(f) (1982).
52. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(b) (1982).
53. Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 110-15 (1974).
54. See, e.g., Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 1974).
55. See, e.g., Grogg v. General Motors Corp., 72 F.R.D. 523, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
56. See, e.g., Chicago & Northwest Ry. v. Minnesota Ry., 371 F.2d 129, 131-32 (8th
Cir. 1967).
57. De Haas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809, 815-16 (D. Colo. 1968), aff'd,
435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955,
957-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971).
58. Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
59. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179
(8th Cir. 1979).
60. Hedges Enters. v. Continental Group, Inc., 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,717
(E.D. Pa. June 20, 1979); In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D.
Tex.), afl'd, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir. 1979); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 82 F.R.D. 647,
650 (D.D.C. 1979).
61. 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
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bution exists under the Sherman Act,62 the Clayton Act,6" or fed-
eral common law by rejecting arguments in favor of contribution.
Nevertheless, the contribution issue did not die; in fact, Justice
Burger's invitation to Congress to provide a legislative solution to
this problem only intensified the debate:
The policy questions presented by petitioner's claimed right to contribution
are far reaching. In declining to provide a right to contribution, we neither
reject the validity of those arguments nor adopt the views of those opposing
contribution. Rather, we recognize that, regardless of the merits of the con-
flicting arguments, this is a matter for Congress, not the courts, to resolve.
The range of factors to be weighed in deciding whether a right to contri-
bution should exist demonstrates the inappropriateness of judicial resolution
of this complex issue. Ascertaining what is "fair" in this setting calls for in-
quiry into the entire spectrum of antitrust law, not simply the elements of a
particular case or category of cases. Similarly, whether contribution would
strengthen or weaken enforcement of the antitrust laws, or what form a right
to contribution should take, cannot be resolved without going beyond the rec-
ord of a single lawsuit.
8 4
While Congress may be better equipped than the courts to deal
with the damage allocation issue, Congress has not yet reached a
consensus concerning a contribution statute.6
III. THE CONTRIBUTION DEBATE
A. The Case for Contribution
1. Fairness
The principal rationale for adopting a rule of contribution in
antitrust cases is fairness. Mandatory trebling, joint and several li-
ability, prohibition of contribution and claim reduction, class ac-
tions, prevailing plaintiff's right to attorneys' fees, liberal statute of
limitations' tolling provisions, and lenient standards for proving
damages combine to give plaintiffs enormous incentives to bring
antitrust claims and significant leverage in prosecuting these
claims. 6 Plaintiffs do not hesitate to exploit that leverage to take
unfair advantage of defendants. Permitting contribution would
create a more equitable balance of power between plaintiffs and
defendants in antitrust litigation.
62. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982).
64. Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 646-47.
65. See infra notes 207-53 and accompanying text.
66. See ITDR Hearings, supra note 25, at 31-32 (prepared statement of Ira M. Mill-
stein); Millstein, Birrell & Kessler, supra note 38, at 958-61.
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a. Whipsaw settlements
Under the present system, defendants feel victimized by plain-
tiffs' whipsaw settlement tactics." For example, in a price-fixing
67. See House Damage Hearings, supra note 26, at 309-13 (prepared statement of
Benjamin Civiletti, an attorney with the Baltimore firm of Venable, Baetjer, Howard & Civi-




Market Settlement Amount Per Point
Company Share Date ($ Million) ($ Million)
FELONY INDICTEES
International Paper 8.3 8/24/78 8.3 1.0
Champion 5.36 12/18/78 24.12 4.5
Weyerhaeuser 7.83 1/06/79 39.15 5.0
Owens-Illinois 5.45 1/12/79 32.70 6.0
Olinkraft 1.22 1/12/79 7.35 6.0
Continental Group 4.22 1/16/79 27.43 6.5
MISDEMEANOR INDICTEES
Boise Cascade 2.82 12/18/78 9.89 3.5
Container Corp. 8.56 1/06/79 34.24 4.0
Inland Container 7.29 1/18/79 34.63 4.75
Stone Container 3.05 1/18/79 14.49 4.75
St. Joe Paper Co. 2.62 1/18/79 12.47 4.75
UNINDICTED COMPANIES
St. Regis Paper Co. 3.97 7/21/78 1.98 .5
Union Camp 3.7 12/13/78 7.40 2.0
Diamond International .5 12/14/78 1.00 2.0
Dura Container .37 12/14/78 .75 2.0
Chesapeake Corp. 1.26 12/18/78 3.02 2.4
Longview Fibre 2.58 12/18/78 6.45 2.5
Willamette Industries 4.18 12/18/78 11.29 2.7
Menasha Corp. 1.67 12/18/78 4.59 2.75
MacMillan-Bloedel 2.11 12/18/78 8.44 4.0
U.S. Corrugated .76 1/25/79 3.07 4.0
Green Bay Packaging 1.71 1/25/79 5.56 3.25
Id. at 330; see Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judi-
ciary of the United States Senate, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 68-73 (1981) [hereinafter S. 995
Hearings] (testimony of George Kress, Chief Executive Officer, Green Bay Packaging, Inc.).
Mr. Kress stated that his firm, Green Bay Packaging, Inc;, felt coerced into settling with the
plaintiffs in In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation even though the company,
unlike other defendants, had not been indicted on criminal price-fixing charges and none of
its customers was a named plaintiff. Id. at 71. Plaintiffs offered to settle with Green Bay
Packaging, which represented less than 2% of the sales in question, for $5.5 million or $3.7
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case involving numerous firms, plaintiffs target certain defendants,
usually deep-pocket defendants, and offer them a sweetheart set-
tlement. Those defendants accept the discount settlement and are
released from any further liability. This approach accomplishes
two goals: (1) plaintiffs receive cash to finance the suit against
other defendants; and (2) plaintiffs gain the ability to exert more
pressure on other defendants because if the settlement was for less
than the defendant's share of damages, the nonsettling defendants
now are exposed to damages disproportionate to their degree of
responsibilitye 8 Because there is no claim reduction under the an-
titrust laws, the settlement amounts are set-off, not against the ac-
tual damages claimed but rather against the final trebled amount.
In effect, treble damages combined with the lack of claim reduc-
tion could diminish the settlement to one-third of its actual value.
Thereafter, plaintiffs may engage in a second or third round of
settlement overtures. With each succeeding round, the asking price
for peace increases and the concomitant risk of an enormous liabil-
ity judgment for those remaining at trial increases. Defendants
million per market share point. Id. at 71-72. This offer was 7.5 times greater than the
$500,000 per market share point that had been offered to the defendants who had settled
early. Id. at 71. Kress observed:
Green Bay thereby realized that it faced a monumental decision-pay the $5.5 million
settlement, or face the financial risk that it may ultimately be the only remaining de-
fendant who, under the existing law, would be jointly and severally liable for the entire
amount of damages which may be allowed by a jury for the alleged pricefixing conspir-
acy. The absence of a right of contribution and claim reduction therefore served to
coerce us into a settling posture.
An estimate of the potential damages which might be decided by a Court was then
necessary in order that a proper assessment of the situation be made.
Using a variety of assumptions in order to arrive at a feasible damage figure which
might ultimately be determined by a jury, we assumed that a damage figure of 5 per-
cent of the total industry annual sales was feasible. Subtracting the settlements already
made, and multiplying the results by 2 12 times after taxes, we concluded that we must
stand ready to bear the burden of a potential legal liability of from 2 to 5 billion dollars
if we followed our original decision to defend our innocence of any civil antitrust
liability.
Id. at 72.
68. For example, assume that a price-fixing conspiracy imposed $20 million of
overcharges on plaintiffs. Defendant X has a 25% share of the price-fixed sales or $5 mil-
lion. X settles with the plaintiffs for $1 million. Because of the principle of joint and several
liability, plaintiffs may still assert their claims for overcharges imposed by X against all
nonsettling defendants. Thus, plaintiffs would be permitted to offer proof that overcharges
amounted to $20 million. If successful, plaintiffs' award would be trebled automatically to
$60 million. At that point, the court would deduct the $1 million settlement payment by X.
Plaintiffs could collect $59 million from the nonsettling defendants. In effect, by settling for
$1 million, X has been able to shift to its nonsettling codefendants liability in the amount of
$14 million-$5 million trebled minus the $1 million settlement.
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who are either marginal players in the conspiracy or wrongfully ac-
cused feel extorted by such tactics. Even those defendants who
were acquitted in the criminal phase of the case are not immune
from pressures to settle and may find themselves competing for an
early settlement to avoid the alternative risk of going to trial and
being held liable for damages wholly out of proportion to any
wrongdoing.69 Perhaps even more unfair is the fact that these com-
panies, precisely because they are small players with marginal cul-
pability, are rarely if ever offered settlement terms comparable to
those provided to the ringleaders.
The lack of contribution in antitrust cases permits the utiliza-
tion of whipsaw tactics that result in defendants paying settlement
amounts bearing no reasonable relationship to their degree of cul-
pability or their benefits from the conspiracy. The most culpable
defendants may pay the least in settlement, while the least culpa-
ble defendants may be exposed to a disproportionate share of
liability.
b. Impact on business operations
Wholly apart from the inequities created by whipsaw tactics, a
no-contribution scheme may impair the ability of a defendant firm
to compete. 70 The doctrine of joint and several liability permits a
plaintiff to proceed against any defendant.71 A plaintiff's decision
to proceed against a given defendant may result in that defend-
ant's financial ruin.72 At the very least, a catastrophic judgment
would impair the firm's ability to obtain credit.73 The no-contribu-
tion rule may distort a defendant's potential liability even prior to
69. See S. 995 Hearings, supra note 67, at 71-73 (testimony of George Kress).
70. See Antitrust and Trade Regulation Committee of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, Report on Treble Damages, 40 THE RECORD 647, 654-55 (1985) [here-
inafter City Bar Report on Treble Damages] (pointing out the profound impact of
mandatory trebling combined with joint and several liability); see also Kline v. Coldwell
Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226, 234 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975):
The amount of recovery is not ordinarily of concern where a wrong has been inflicted
and an injury suffered. But when 2,000 are joined in a class action in which each is
jointly and severally liable, the liability is increased in geometric progression. Such an
award [of upwards of three quarters of a billion dollars] against each of 2,000 real es-
tate broker defendants would shock the conscience.
Id. at 234; Main St. Drugs v. Beer Distribs., Inc., 26 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 87, 90
(N.D. Ind. 1978) (stating that the current antitrust damages scheme might well bankrupt
many of the present and potential defendants).
71. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 28, § 46.
72. See S. 995 Hearings, supra note 67, at 71-73 (testimony of George Kress).
73. Id. at 73.
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judgment because contingent liabilities must be noted on a firm's
financial statement. Since a marginal defendant could be held lia-
ble for one hundred percent of total damages, a defendant must
disclose that fact, which may impair a company's credit rating
while the suit is pending.
c. Uncertainty in the antitrust laws
The antitrust laws are not a model of clarity, and the scope of
their prohibitions is not always apparent ex ante. While there are
some areas of antitrust law, including horizontal price-fixing, hori-
zontal division of territories and concerted refusals to deal, where
liability is clear and unambiguous, there are many areas where lia-
bility is neither clear nor settled. Territorial restraints imposed by
a manufacturer on a dealer, exclusive dealing arrangements, and
requirements contracts, for example, restrain trade but at the same
time provide significant procompetitive benefits that outweigh any
such restraint. 5 The legality of these arrangements is judged on a
case by case basis.
Particularly perplexing is the law with respect to conspiracy.
The Supreme Court has held that proof of an express agreement is
not required to establish an antitrust conspiracy.76 Nevertheless,
the line between an illicit tacit agreement and legitimate parallel
conduct is vague and ill-defined. 7  The Supreme Court, in Mon-
santo7 8 and more recently in Matsushita,79 sought to clarify the
standards governing proof of conspiracy. The Court held that in
order to establish conspiracy a plaintiff must show a "conscious
commitment to a common scheme." 80 What constitutes a "con-
scious commitment to a common scheme," however, is far from
self-evident. A party may be held to have conspired even though it
74. Congress drafted the antitrust laws with broad brush. See American Soc'y of
Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 573 n.11 (1982) (observing that
Congress desired that the antitrust rules sweep broadly); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF ANTITRUST 13 (1977) (stating that "[t]he substantive provisions of the Sherman Act
are stated in brief compass but in broad, suggestive language").
75. See, e.g., Continental Television Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,-Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
76. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939).
77. Compare id. (stating that conspiracy may be found when defendants, "knowing
that concerted action was contemplated and invited[,] . . .gave their adherence to the
scheme and participated in it") with Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp.,
346 U.S. 537, 541 (1951) (stating that "'conscious parallelism' has not yet read conspiracy
out of the Sherman Act entirely").
78. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
79. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
80. Morsanto, 465 U.S. at 764.
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did not know the identity of the other conspirators and the precise
scope of the conspiracy.81 Under these circumstances it is unduly
harsh to expose such a minor actor to joint and several liability for
the entire treble damage amount.
In United States v. Container Corp.2 the Supreme Court held
that reciprocal exchanges of current pricing information are unlaw-
ful when the following economic factors are present: a market
dominated by few sellers, inelasticity of demand entry in the face
of overcapacity and declining prices, and product fungibility
8 3
Given the presence of these factors, the Court found that "The in-
ferences are irresistible that the exchange of price information has
had an anticompetitive effect in the industry, chilling the vigor of
price competition.""s It is difficult to derive a bright-line rule from
the Container holding and unclear whether infrequent reciprocal
exchanges of price information are unlawful when the inferences of
anticompetitive effect are less than "irresistible."" Indeed, in
United States v. United States Gypsum Co."8 the Supreme Court
seemed to retreat somewhat from the Container holding by sug-
gesting that an interseller price verification program, which in-
volved infrequent reciprocal exchanges of price information, is not
invariably anticompetitive and may well promote vigorous price
competition.8 7 Consequently, it would be unfair to expose a party
who has casually exchanged price information to the same penal-
ties that await the boldest price-fixer.88
d. Baseless suits
The rule of joint and several liability may encourage baseless
antitrust suits or, at the very least, may encourage the inclusion of
81. Hoffman LaRoche, Inc. v. Greenberg, 447 F.2d 872 (7th Cir. 1971); see, e.g., United
States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 275 (1942) (holding that conspiracy properly found
when defendant became aware that contract was part of larger anticompetitive arrange-
ment); Interstate Circuit, Inc., 306 U.S. at 226 (stating that "[i]t was enough that, knowing
that concerted action was contemplated and invited, the distributors gave their adherence
to the scheme and participated in it").
82. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
83. Id. at 336-37.
84. Id. at 337.
85. See, e.g., United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 457-59 (1978)
(indicating that although the consequence of the informal and infrequent exchange of price
information among competitors, even absent specific agreement to fix prices, is likely to be
price stability, there may be circumstances in which exchanges may be procompetitive).
86. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).




claims against innocent defendants in addition to the claims
against culpable defendants. 9 The liberalized pleading standards
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure"0 encourage plaintiffs to
paint their claims with a broad brush that may not distinguish be-
tween key operatives in a conspiracy and those acting, if at all, on
the fringe.9 1 Where the major sellers in a given field are allegedly
involved in a conspiracy, the temptation is great to characterize
the conspiracy as "nationwide" or "industry-wide" and to treat all
market participants as guilty. Innocent defendants thus must ei-
ther settle or risk the uncertainties of litigation. Baseless suits,
combined with the whipsaw settlement tactics described above, il-
lustrate how the no-contribution rule is especially unfair to inno-
cent sellers operating in the culpable defendants' marketplace.
2. Deterrence
Adoption of a rule permitting contribution may enhance de-
terrence.92 Under the present system, an antitrust defendant, how-
ever blameworthy, may totally escape liability if the plaintiff
chooses to proceed against other conspirators. Under these circum-
stances, a defendant may choose to violate the law and take the
chance that ultimately someone else will have to pay the victims. A
contribution rule would mean that a wrongdoer would always have
to pay. Proponents of contribution argue that the certainty of
sharing in the liability would be a greater deterrent than the possi-
bility of paying the entire trebled amount," especially since the
latter alternative entails the possibility that a culpable defendant
may pay nothing. Moreover, the no-contribution rule may
overdeter and, in effect, deter legal conduct that has significant
procompetitive benefits.9 4 In United States v. United States Gyp-
89. See, e.g., House Damage Hearings, supra note 26, at 402-03 (prepared statement of
Burnell R. Roberts, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Mead Corp.).
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
91. See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 756 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1985).
Marginal defendants, such as the Mead Corporation, were grouped together with the con-
spiracy's central operatives.
92. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179,
1185 (8th Cir. 1979); Sullivan, supra note 14, at 412.
93. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d at 1185; S. REP. No. 359, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. 18 (1982); Sullivan, supra note 14, at 412; see also S. 995 Hearings, supra note 67,
at 40 (testimony of Robert Joffe, Chairman, Committee on Trade Regulation, New York
City Bar Association) (arguing that treble damage liability and criminal exposure are the
true deterrents of illegal behavior in the antitrust field).
94. House Damage Hearings, supra note 26, at 9 (testimony of Stephen D. Susman,
attorney, Susman & McGowan) (testifying that lack of contribution for vertical antitrust
1987] 1293
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
sum Co. 5 the Supreme Court, in the context of a criminal antitrust
case, cautioned against the dangers of overdeterrence: "[SIalutary
and procompetitive conduct lying close to the borderline of imper-
missible conduct might be shunned by businessmen who choose to
be excessively cautious in the face of uncertainty regarding possi-
ble exposure to criminal punishment for even a good faith error of
judgment." 96 This admonition applies equally to civil cases. Some
nonprice vertical restraints, such as location clauses and exclusive
dealing arrangements, may offer procompetitive benefits that may
be excessively discouraged by a rule of joint and several liability
without contribution. 7
3. Settlement
A contribution rule would eliminate the unfair whipsaw settle-
ment tactics that plaintiffs have commonly used. The settlement
process therefore would become more equitable. Settlement
amounts would be based on defendants' culpability or benefits de-
rived from the conspiracy rather than on the fear of enormous lia-
bility from an adverse judgment. Defendants would no longer be
caught in an irrational settlement stampede. Contribution also
may discourage early, bargain basement settlements because plain-
tiffs could not shift the burden of satisfying a judgment onto non-
settling defendants. This is not to say, however, that settlements
will not be reached; significant incentives to settle remain, wholly
apart from joint and several liability. Only unfair settlements and
the pressure to enter into unfair settlements would be eliminated.
Although the federal system encourages settlements,98 settlements
are not its primary objective; the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
seek to foster the just resolution of claims as well.9 9 Allowing con-
tribution may place plaintiffs in a less advantageous posture to ne-
gotiate early, favorable settlements, but this is simply the quid pro
quo for a fairer system of damage allocation. The plaintiff's advan-
tageous bargaining position was created, in part, by the unfair na-
offenses might discourage socially useful conduct).
95. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
96. Id. at 441.
97. See House Damage Hearings, supra note 26, at 9.
98. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) (making settlement an appropriate agenda item
for pretrial conferences); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S.
321, 346-47 (1971) (stating that promotion of settlement is consistent with the aims of the
treble damages remedy).
99. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (stating that the Federal Rules shall be construed "to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action").
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ture of the no-contribution rule.
4. Costs of a Contribution Rule
A contribution rule would add new issues to antitrust litiga-
tion, increasing the length and cost of trials.10 0 These undesirable
aspects of the rule are mitigated by several factors. First, the final
allocation of damages would be fairer. Second, plaintiffs' right to
recovery and payment would not be affected. Plaintiffs still may
collect from any defendants they choose. If simultaneous trial of
the contribution issues unduly complicates the trial and thereby
prejudices the plaintiffs, the contribution issues could be severed
and determined expeditiously in a separate proceeding. 1°1 Third,
there is no basis for assuming that determination of contribution
issues would overwhelm the courts. In related areas of law, most
notably the securities field, which presents issues comparable in
complexity to antitrust cases, courts have had little difficulty ap-
100. See ABA Contribution Monograph, supra note 2, which states:
In the first instance, contribution complicates antitrust litigation by introducing new
parties, claims and issues. New parties are those potentially added by the defendants
by way of cross-claims for contribution. The new claims are the contribution claims
asserted, most likely, between all defendants. The new issues are those bearing on the
damage allocation formula that is employed by the particular contribution legislation
enacted. Depending on what that formula is, it will be necessary to define markets and
determine market shares, assess relative culpability, or otherwise determine propor-
tional responsibility.
A rule of contribution is very likely to lead to the filing of numerous cross-claims.
In a ten-member price fixing conspiracy, there exists the potential for ninety contribu-
tion cross-claims. In a national class action, that potential can be much greater. The
Corrugated Container litigation involved 37 original defendants, allowing conceivably
for 1,332 cross-claims. The Folding Cartons litigation involved over 40 defendants and
thus over 1,600 possible cross-claims. Judge Hubert L. Will, who presided over the
Folding Cartons case, testified on the likely course of that litigation had contribution
been available when it was filed.
"If contribution and claim reduction had been the law at that time, each of these
defendants could have and undoubtedly would have filed cross-claims for contribution
against the other defendants and these hundreds of additional claims, cross-claims,
third-party claims, answers and related motions would have seriously threatened any
chance for the successful management of the case."
Id. at 33 (footnote omitted) (quoting House Damage Hearings, supra note 26, at 252 (letter
from Hon. Judge Hubert L. Will to Rep. Peter Rodino)); see also S. 995 Hearings, supra
note 67, at 122-28 (testimony of William Baxter, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Divi-
sion, United States Department of Justice); House Damage Hearings, supra note 26, at 4-6
(testimony of A. Stephens Clay, an attorney with the Atlanta firm of Kilpatrick & Cody); id.
at 18 (prepared statement of Stephen D. Susman); HousE STAFF REPORT, supra note 10, at
12 (conceding that "some complications and protraction would result").
101. S. REP. No. 359, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24 (1982) (suggesting that the wide lati-
tude afforded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for control of litigation make it un-
likely that contribution issues will overly complicate a case).
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plying contribution rules. In any event, the courts have sufficient
authority to limit the quantum and order of proof on contribution
issues in order to prevent a trial from becoming unwieldy." 2
B. The Case Against Contribution
1. Fairness
Opponents of contribution are not moved by claims that the
present system of joint and several liability is unfair.0 3 First, price
fixing is an intentional act.104 Those who have purposefully and
secretly conspired to fix prices are not entitled to any leniency.10 5
Second, the argument that the no-contribution rule is unfair is
based upon hindsight: contribution is perceived as unfair after de-
fendants have committed acts that arguably violate the antitrust
laws. 106 When viewed prior to the time any wrongdoing is commit-
ted, the antitrust laws affect all actors equally because each actor
must consider the risk of antitrust liability. 10 7 Only those who,
through their conduct, violate the antitrust laws risk unequal
treatment; they may be held liable for the entire damages amount
and unable to obtain contribution.
Third, the success of a conspiracy depends on the participa-
tion of all members. 08 In this "one for all and all for one" atmo-
sphere, it is difficult to assess individual liability based on degree
of participation or benefits derived. In effect, responsibility is indi-
visible, and the concept of contribution is somewhat artificial.
2. Deterrence
The case against contribution argues that a contribution rule
would have an adverse impact on the deterrence of antitrust viola-
tions."0 9 Joint and several liability combined with treble damages
102. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b); S. REP. No. 359, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 23-24 (1982).
103. See Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 339.
104. House Damage Hearings, supra note 26, at 9-10 (testimony of Stephen D.
Susman).
105. See Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 339.
106. Id. at 342.
107. Id.
108. The recent collapse of OPEC supports this view. As long as OPEC members lim-
ited their production, they were able to maintain artificially high prices. When members
ignored production limits, oil prices plummeted. See ABA Contribution Monograph, supra
note 2, at 21.
109. Hearings on S. 1468 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly and Business
Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 7
(1979) (testimony of John H. Shenefield, Assistant Attorney General, United States Depart-
1296 [Vol. 40:1277
ANTITRUST REFORM
provides a very powerful deterrent to potential antitrust violators.
If, as would be the case under a contribution rule, the violator is
liable for, at most, a specified portion of a treble damages judg-
ment, the violator is less likely to feel restrained in its behavior
than it would were it severally liable for treble the entire amount
of damages inflicted by the conspiracy. In effect, contribution
serves to subsidize price-fixing as well as other activities illegal
under the antitrust laws. In addition, because a contribution rule
makes individual liability more certain, it is easier, at least in the-
ory, to develop a cost-benefit analysis regarding a company's illegal
acts.
The argument that the present system overdeters is more the-
oretical than real. 110 In theory, it is possible that conduct having
procompetitive benefits, and thus subject to the so-called "rule of
reason," might be chilled."' In reality, however, few "rule of rea-
son" cases result in findings of liability." Furthermore, the pri-
mary target of the no-contribution rule is horizontal price-fixing,




The present system encourages defendants to compete for
early settlements at favorable terms. The possibility that plaintiffs
may offer sweetheart settlements to the most culpable actors is a
benefit and not a shortcoming of the no-contribution rule. Al-
though settlement demands of parties who hold out escalate as a
case proceeds to trial, this is one of the many risks that must be
taken into account in determining whether and when to settle.
ment of Justice); House Damage Hearings, supra note 26, at 17-18 (prepared statement of
Stephen D. Susman).
110. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
111. House Damage Hearings, supra note 26, at 9 (testimony of Stephen D. Susman).
112. There are, of course, cases in which liability has been found under a rule of rea-
son standard. See, e.g., National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ.
of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (holding that NCAA rules limiting appearances of member
schools in televised football games were illegal under the rule of reason); Eiberger v. SONY
Corp. of Am., 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that certain vertically imposed territo-
rial restriction on sales were unlawful).
113. ITDR Hearings, supra note 25, at 13-14 (prepared statement of Charles F. Rule,
Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, United States Department of Jus-
tice) (stating that "moreover, to the extent a change in damage allocation rules provides
relief to businesses engaged in felonious antitrust activities as opposed to those businesses
engaged in competitively ambiguous conduct subject to the rule of reason, that change will
affect only conduct that has no merit and cannot be overdeterred").
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Moreover, as discussed above,1 " the very nature of joint and sev-
eral liability makes potential damage exposure unpredictable; and
where exposure is large, a rule of joint and several liability pushes
defendants toward settlement.
On the other hand, a contribution rule removes some of the
incentive to settle. Early "discount" settlements would become less
frequent because plaintiffs would be unable to determine what is
sacrificed by settling. Most contribution proposals include "carve
out" provisions that would remove the settling defendant's sales
from the case;' unlike the present system, a contribution rule
with a "carve out" provision would not permit recovery of
overcharges imposed upon a nonsettling defendant. A defendant
would be less eager to settle early if contribution were permitted
because a defendant could calculate more easily its share of liabil-
ity under a contribution formula."16 At worst, this may result in
more trials and fewer settlements; at best, this may lengthen set-
tlement negotiations. In either case, significant process costs are
likely to be incurred.
4. Costs and Complexity
More trials and fewer settlements are just one source of in-
creased costs that would inevitably result from a contribution rule.
Trials themselves might involve new parties and would become
lengthier and more costly.1 7 Contribution formulas may further
complicate already complex antitrust issues." 8 This is particularly
likely in cases involving vertical conspiracies or conspiracies that
contain both horizontal and vertical aspects. 1 9 Defendants have an
incentive to spread potential losses as widely as possible and thus
would be inclined to bring marginal "co-conspirators" into the con-
tribution phase of the suit, which further adds to costs and delay.
Since a right of contribution would make defendants adversaries,
they may have less incentive to cooperate on discovery. 20 Judicial
114. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., S. 380, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 41(b) (1983); H.R. 2244, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 4(a) (1983); S. 995, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 41(b) (1982); H.R. 4072, 97th Cong., Ist
Sess. § 41(b) (1981); S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 41(b) (1979).
116. House Damage Hearings, supra note 26, at 7-9 (prepared statement of A. Ste-
phens Clay); id. at 19 (prepared statement of Stephen D. Susman); ABA Contribution Mon-
ograph, supra note 2, at 37-40.
117. See supra note 100; HousE STAFF REPORT, supra note 10, at 12.
118. See infra notes 220-53 and accompanying text.
119. Id.
120. ABA Contribution Monograph, supra note 2, at 33-34.
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economies that might have been achieved by cooperative defenses
are thus lost. While a contribution rule would provide significant
advantages to defendants, it would create significant disadvantages
for both plaintiffs and the federal judicial system.
C. Analysis of the Debate
The contribution debate has been characterized by a lack of
analytical precision. 121 This imprecision is due to the enormous
complexity of the issue and the inability to quantify the concepts
upon which the debate has focused-fairness and deterrence. The
key issue is whether the instances of unfairness are sufficiently se-
rious and widespread to justify a major change in antitrust damage
allocation rules, which might weaken the deterrent mechanism of
the private damage remedy and ultimately increase the cost of
litigation.
1. Fairness
Some commentators dismiss the fairness argument by saying
that the law ought to have no sympathy for defendants who are
intentional tortfeasors. 22 This rather cavalier dismissal of the fair-
ness problem is far from compelling. First, the Supreme Court rec-
ognized in Illinois Brick12 3 that the fair treatment of antitrust de-
fendants, including accused price-fixers, is important. 24 A
principal reason for the Court's ruling that indirect purchasers are
not "injured" as a matter of law under section four of the Clayton
Act was the danger that permitting indirect purchaser plaintiffs to
proceed would create serious risks of double recovery. The Court
specifically rejected suggestions that a slight risk of double recov-
ery was acceptable.'25 In Kline v. Coldwell Banker & Co.'21 the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit expressed concern about the
geometric escalation of antitrust damages resulting from the com-
bined effects of treble damages, class actions, and joint and several
liability. The ancient precept that jointly liable intentional wrong-
doers are not entitled to contribution is outmoded. Contribution
121. Breit & Elzinga, supra note 8, at 423.
122. Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 339.
123. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
124. Id. at 731 n.11 (specifically rejecting plaintiff's contention on oral argument that
"a little slopover on the shoulders of the wrongdoers . . . is acceptable").
125. Id. at 731 (stating that "we are unwilling to 'open the door to duplicative recov-
eries' under § 4" (quoting Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 264 (1972)).
126. 508 F.2d 226, 234 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
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has been allowed under federal securities law in cases in which de-
fendants have knowingly violated rule 10b-5.1 7 Thus, fairness con-
cerns cannot be ignored merely because the subjects are alleged
intentional wrongdoers.
Second, even if opponents of contribution are correct in dis-
missing concerns for fair treatment of intentional wrongdoers, the
fact remains that not all antitrust violations are the products of
intentional wrongdoing. Conspiracy may be inferred in some in-
stances but not in others, depending on the facts existing in a
given marketplace. 128 Furthermore, alleged violations governed by
the so-called "rule of reason" frequently involve conduct having
significant procompetitive potential and can hardly be said to en-
tail intentional violations of the law.129 Even assuming that inten-
tional wrongdoers are estopped from seeking equitable treatment,
fairness concerns cannot be conveniently ignored when violations
of the law were unintentional. Hence, the ex ante/ex post distinc-
tion,130 which has some force in the case of intentional wrongdoing,
is inapposite when intent is not involved.
On the other hand, it is true that the vast majority of success-
ful antitrust prosecutions involve horizontal price-fixing and that
defendants are generally victorious in "rule of reason" cases.' In-
deed, the situations that purportedly illustrate the harshness of
the no-contribution rule generally involve price-fixing.13 2 There-
127. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd per
curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971); McLean v. Alexander, 449
F. Supp. 1251, 1267 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979).
128. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1
(1979) (holding that blanket licensing of copyrighted music compositions creates efficiencies
which outweigh any detriment to competition); Continental Television Inc. v. GTE Sylva-
nia, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (upholding validity of location clauses imposed by a manufac-
turer); see also R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 285-88 (1978) (applauding the Sylvania
opinion for its economically sophisticated approach to antitrust policy).
130. See Easterbrook, Posner & Landes, supra note 1, at 341.
131. This is not surprising because horizontal price-fixing is a naked restraint and
hence governed by a per se standard. In per se cases, elaborate inquiries into justifications
for the particular restraints are foreclosed; plaintiff need show only that the agreement in
question had on anticompetitive purpose or effect. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150, 224-26 & n.59 (1940). In rule of reason cases, defendants are permitted to
introduce evidence justifying their utilization of a particular restraint of trade. Conse-
quently, by definition, rule of reason cases are more difficult for plaintiffs to win. For a
summary of post-Sylvania decisions on non-price vertical restraints, see ABA ANTITRUST
SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS (SECOND) 65-74 (2d ed. 1984).
132. See, e.g., House Damage Hearings, supra note 26, at 141 (prepared statement of
Robert P. Taylor) (citing In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 1979-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 1 62, 689 (S.D. Tex. May 30, 1979) and In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627
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fore, rule of reason cases may have less significance in the contri-
bution debate. Nevertheless, "rule of reason" cases cannot be casu-
ally dismissed. Even when such cases are successfully defended,
alleged wrongdoers face the risk of disproportionate judgments
and the risk of whipsaw tactics; this in itself is unfair.
Given that fairness concerns must be seriously weighed, the
next question is whether the problem of unfairness is pervasive in
private antitrust damages actions. If the problem is systemic, re-
medial action may be appropriate, even though this action might
alter the present equilibrium. If the problem is isolated, any reme-
dial action might create a disequilibrium that could seriously im-
pair the private antitrust remedy.1"3 A careful review of the legisla-
tive debates concerning damage allocation reform suggests that the
unfairness arguments have been generated by a few well-publicized
cases. The problem is hence not as pervasive as it might appear at
first glance.
The circumstances surrounding many of these well-publicized
cases may not recur. For example, in In re Corrugated Container
Antitrust Litigation1 34 the Mead Corporation, a marginal defend-
ant that had previously been acquitted of any wrongdoing in crimi-
nal proceedings, proceeded to trial in the civil phase of the suit,
but lost on the liability issue and faced treble damage exposure for
substantially all of the illegal overcharges. The Mead plight is in-
frequent because over ninety percent of antitrust treble damages
actions settle prior to trial. 35 Infrequency of litigated liability
judgments, however, does not mean that the problem of dispropor-
tionate liability can be disregarded. The more fundamental prob-
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1125 (1983)).
133. For a discussion of the interplay of various antitrust substantive remedies against
each other, see Calkins, Summary Judgment, Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of
Equilibrating Tendencies in the Antitrust System, 74 GEo. L.J. 1065, 1083-98 (1986).
134. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., M.D.L. No. 310 (S.D. Tex.) (LEXIS,
Tradereg. Library, Dist. File) (M.D.L. is the abbreviation for multidistrict litigation). In the
criminal phase of the Corrugated Container case, Mead Corporation had been indicted
along with 13 other companies and 26 individuals and subsequently acquitted. Nevertheless,
Mead was named as a defendant in the ensuing private treble damages actions. Companies
that settled early paid only $1 million per market share point. Mead, which had a 3% mar-
ket share, did not settle, went to trial, and was found liable. House Damage Hearings, supra
note 26, at 402-03 (prepared statement of Burnell R. Roberts). The company eventually
settled the damage claim for $45 million or $15 million per market share point. Id. at 402,
In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig. M.D.L. No. 310 (S.D. Tex.) (LEXIS Tradereg.
Library, Dist. File).
135. ABA Contribution Monograph, supra note 2, at 32. But see Millstein, Birrell &
Kessler, supra note 38, at 962-64 (offering Corrugated Container as a case study in the
potential for antitrust remedies abuse).
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lem is that a no-contribution rule exposes defendants to unfair
whipsaw settlement tactics long before the trial begins. The no-
contribution rule changes the calculus of the settlement process;
defendants, faced with the possibility of enormous treble damages
judgments, irrespective of their degree of involvement in the con-
spiracy, feel unfairly pressured to settle for amounts that bear no
relation to their degree of culpability. Contribution therefore is
necessary to restore the balance of power between plaintiffs and
defendants. A contribution rule does not necessarily impair the
settlement process. Experience with contribution rules under the
federal securities laws1 86 suggests that such rules present no special
hurdles to settlement.
The argument that contribution is needed to avoid whipsaw
settlement tactics, however, ignores two very significant counter-
points. First, in any litigation, significant incentives to settle exist
wholly apart from the amount in controversy. Parties want to limit
attorneys' fees, ongoing administrative expenses associated with
trial preparation,3 7 loss of time for executives who are involved in
discovery and trial preparation, and minimize the negative public-
ity caused by the pending dispute. Parties also may pursue settle-
ment so as not to disrupt business relations. Thus, potentially un-
capped liability is not the sole reason for settling antitrust cases.
Moreover, even proponents of contribution concede that the
present system does promote favorable settlements for certain de-
fendants. The question then becomes whether the benefits pro-
vided by early favorable settlements are outweighed by unfairness
to "whipsawed" defendants. The case for contribution is weakened
by this cost/benefit analysis. On the one hand, the present system
unquestionably promotes early settlements and thereby enables
plaintiffs to finance continued prosecution of suits against alleged
violators. Indeed, a prominent criticism of the present system is
that it promotes a veritable rush to settlement. On the other hand,
there is little hard evidence that unfair whipsaw settlements are
pervasive in the antitrust arena, notwithstanding the widespread
perception to the contrary."' Even within the Department of Jus-
136. See Scott, Resurrecting Indemnification: Contribution Clauses in Underwriting
Agreements, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 223, 256 (1986) (stating that per capita contribution in secur-
ities cases "may also encourage early settlements").
137. These expenses include costs associated with file searches, duplicating, witness
preparation, experts' fees, and discovery.
138. See, e.g., ABA Contribution Monograph, supra note 2, at 17-18; ITDR Hearings,
supra note 25, at 19 (prepared statement of Charles F. Rule) (testifying that existence of
1302 [Vol. 40:1277
1987] ANTITRUST REFORM 1303
tice, unanimity on this issue is lacking as divergent statements by
Antitrust Division heads within the last two years clearly
illustrate.
139
In addition, critics of the present system urge that it promotes
baseless suits. 140 Even if joint and several liability encourages base-
less suits, firms so victimized now have a remedy-sanctions under
rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 14  Amended rule 11
was promulgated in 1983 to deter the assertion of frivolous claims
by providing mandatory sanctions against an attorney or client if
the attorney signs a pleading that is not well-grounded in fact or
law or interposed for an improper purpose, such as "to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litiga-
tion."'142 Amended rule 11 provides an objective "reasonableness"
standard in place of the more rigorous subjective "bad faith" test
that previously had governed and thereby offers a stronger deter-
rent to strike suits. 14  While courts rarely imposed sanctions under
former rule 11,'4 particularly in antitrust matters,'14 courts appear
abuses under the present system "remains largely theoretical and anecdotal"); HOUSE STAFF
REPORT, supra note 10, at 1 (concluding that "[t]he record evidence of unfairness in current
damage allocation among defendants is at best elusive"). But see S. REP. No. 359, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 18-22 (1982); House Damage Hearings, supra note 26, at 141 (prepared
statement of Robert P. Taylor); S. REP. No. 428, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1979). ABA Con-
tribution Monograph, supra note 2, at 9; ITDR Hearings, supra note 25, at 30-31 (prepared
statement of Ira M. Millstein).
139. Compare ITDR Hearings, supra note 25, at 19 (prepared statement of Charles F.
Rule) (testifying that the existence of abuses under the present system "remains largely
theoretical and anecdotal") with Antitrust Remedies Reform: Hearings on S. 2162 Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1986) (statement of Douglas
H. Ginsburg, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, United States Department of
Justice) (stating that "[aifter examining the record of antitrust damage allocation, we are
convinced that there is a real problem to be solved, namely the use or potential use of
whipsaw settlements").
140. See, e.g., House Damage Hearings, supra note 26, at 403 (prepared statement of
Burnell R. Roberts) (asserting that "I have always believed that in our society if you are
innocent you should not submit to blackmail").
141. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
142. Id.
143. Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 762 F.2d 243, 253 (2d Cir. 1985) (observing
that "subjective good faith no longer provides the safe harbor it once did").
144. One author observed:
In view of litigation activity from 1938 to 1976, it was found that rule 11 motions had
been filed in only nineteen reported cases. Among these cases, violations were found in
eleven instances, and attorneys were sanctioned in only three. Lest these findings be
dismissed as outdated, another report reviewed the relevant case law through 1979 and
found only one additional reported opinion in which counsel was disciplined under rule
11.
S. KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS 2 (1985) (footnotes omitted); see also
Mr. Frank, Inc. v. Waste Management, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 859, 870 (N.D. I1. 1984); Pudlo v.
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more hospitable to the amended rule and have not hesitated to
impose sanctions when appropriate, especially in antitrust cases. 46
The 1983 Amendments to rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure further strengthened the protection from baseless
claims. Rule 16(c)(1) permits the court to dismiss, without neces-
sity of formal motion papers, meritless claims. 147 Courts can use
this mechanism to dismiss antitrust claims asserted against a de-
fendant simply because it sold in the market in which price-fixing
occurred.
Close examination of the fairness issues reveals that the case
for contribution is far from compelling. The present system from
time to time may permit a defendant to be saddled with dispropor-
tionate liability; but the existence of isolated occurrences does not
justify a radical restructuring of damage allocation rules that may
result in fewer and even more unfair settlements in antitrust ac-
tions. A less intrusive remedy may address more appropriately the
narrow problem of disproportionate liability.
2. Deterrence
No consensus has emerged on the question of the impact of a
contribution rule on the deterrent function of private treble dam-
ages actions. The theoretical analyses by Easterbrook, Posner, and
Landes141 followed by the work of Polinsky and Shavell" 9 have
provided useful insights into the interplay of deterrence and con-
tribution but have not resolved the issue. Whether a contribution
rule is superior to a no-contribution rule depends ultimately on
which competing but equally defensible economic assumptions one
accepts in analyzing the problem. Nor is it clear the extent to
which the assumptions with respect to risk accurately describe the
real world in which economic decisions are actually made and anti-
trust violations are committed. 50
IRS, 587 F. Supp. 1010, 1011 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
145. See, e.g., Byram Concretanks, Inc. v. Warren Concrete Prods. Co., 374 F.2d 649,
651 (3d Cir. 1967) (refusing, in absence of specific statutory authorization, to award defend-
ants attorneys' fees after an alleged baseless antitrust suit had been dismissed).
146. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of N.Y., 762 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1985).
147. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(1).
148. See Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, supra note 1.
149. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3.
150. See S. 995 Hearings, supra note 67, at 50 (statement of Robert D. Joffe) (stating
"[the Trade Regulation Committee of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York]
knows of no empirical evidence that business men, including the most sophisticated, factor
the possibility of liability for an entire industry's actions falling on one firm's shoulders into
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a. Risk analysis and deterrence
i. Theoretical work
Theoretical analyses start with the assumption that alleged
wrongdoers make decisions by rationally weighing the costs and
benefits of wrongdoing.151 Theoreticians further posit that the
decisionmakers' choices depend on their attitude toward risk.152 In
economic parlance, firms are either risk neutral, risk averse, or risk
preferring. A risk neutral firm is a firm that is indifferent to risk
factors.153 It therefore would treat the following situations as
equivalent: a ten percent chance of losing one hundred dollars; a
twenty percent chance of losing fifty dollars; a fifty percent chance
of losing twenty dollars; and a one hundred percent chance of los-
ing ten dollars.1 5 4 In theory, a risk neutral firm will violate the an-
titrust laws if the expected benefit, its share of profits from the
illegal activity, exceeds the expected loss, its share of damages if
the conspiracy is discovered and successfully prosecuted, dis-
counted by the probability of detection and successful
prosecution.1
55
A risk averse firm is a firm that seeks to avoid risk. 56 Given
the choice of a ten percent chance of losing one hundred dollars, a
fifty percent chance of losing twenty dollars, or a one hundred per-
cent chance of losing ten dollars, the risk averse firm would opt for
the last alternative.15 7 Risk avoiders consider both the expected
value of the risk and its absolute magnitude and pursue policies
that minimize exposure to risks of greater absolute magnitude,
even though the chance of suffering that loss is less likely to
occur.
158
A risk preferring firm seeks out risky ventures. Faced with the
choice of a ten percent chance of losing one hundred dollars, a fifty
any decisionmaking process with respect to whether or not they should fix prices"); Note,
Private Suits, supra note 14, at 702 (suggesting that the consequences of joint and several
liability and of a rule denying contribution are "probably not fully appreciated by many
nonlawyers" operating business entities).
151. ABA Contribution Monograph, supra note 2, at 25-26.
152. Id.; see Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 344-45; Polinsky &
Shavell, supra note 3, at 450-55.
153. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3, at 450.
154. Id.
155. Id.; Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 345.
156. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3, at 452-53.
157. Id.; Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 351-52.
158. Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 351-52; Polinsky & Shavell,
supra note 3, at 452.
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percent chance of losing twenty dollars, or a one hundred percent
chance of losing ten dollars, the risk preferring firm will elect the
first option. Like the risk averse firm, the risk preferring firm looks
at both the expected value of the risk and the absolute magnitude.
Even though each of the choices is actuarily equivalent, the first
alternative presents the risk of greatest absolute magnitude and
the least likelihood of apprehension.
For a risk neutral firm, deterrence depends upon the
probability of being sued and found liable, the probability that the
entire judgment will be collected from that firm, and the amount
of the judgment. Professors Polinsky and Shavell 5 9 demonstrate
that, theoretically, a rule of contribution has no additional deter-
rent effect on a risk neutral firm. Polinsky and Shavell assume that
two conspiring companies have a fifty percent chance of being de-
tected and successfully sued. 6 ° With a no-contribution rule, the
likelihood that either would pay the entire judgment is fifty per-
cent.'6 ' If each company would gain ten million dollars from this
fictional conspiracy, the total overcharges trebled would be sixty
million dollars.'6 2 If contribution is not permitted, the expected li-
ability is fifteen million dollars.16 3 The benefit is only ten million
dollars. Therefore, the illegal conduct would be deterred because
the cost, fifteen million dollars, exceeds the benefit, ten million
dollars.6
If contribution is available, the illegal conduct would be
equally deterred. The likelihood of detection and prosecution is
again fifty percent. The total liability for each would be thirty mil-
lion dollars because each conspirator would be liable for one-half
of the sixty million dollar treble damages. Therefore, the expected
value of the violation would be fifteen million dollars. Since the
benefit is again only ten million dollars, the illegal conduct would
be deterred.'
6 5
A contribution rule, however, would affect deterrence ad-
versely if firms were risk averse. Assume that two firms again stand




163. Id. This is because the authors suggest that the conspirators have only a 50%
chance of being detected. If the conspiracy is detected, each conspirator has a 50% chance
of being targeted and successfully prosecuted. Therefore, the expected value of the illegal





to gain ten million dollars from a conspiracy and the probability of
a successful suit is twenty-five percent. 166 The expected liability is
seven and one-half million dollars in this case, while the expected
gain is ten dollars.16 7 If the parties are risk neutral, the conduct
will not be deterred. Under a contribution rule, the expected liabil-
ity would also be seven and one-half million dollars'6 8 and a risk
neutral firm would not be deterred. However, if a firm is risk
averse a contribution rule may provide less deterrence. The abso-
lute magnitude of a loss under a contribution rule, thirty million
dollars, is less than the magnitude of the loss with a no-contribu-
tion rule, sixty million dollars, even though the expected values are
actuarily equivalent.'
A contribution rule may be a greater deterrent to the risk pre-
ferring firms than a no-contribution rule. Risk preferring firms
would rather take a chance on a lower likelihood (fifty percent) of
a greater exposure (sixty million dollars) than on a more certain
likelihood (one hundred percent) of a lesser absolute exposure
(thirty million dollars).
ii. Critique of the theoretical analyses
The theoretical works of Easterbrook, Posner, and Landes, as
well as those of Polinsky and Shavell, provide a rational framework
with which to measure the impact of a contribution rule on deter-
rence. Nevertheless, in their efforts to quantify the parameters of
the debate, the theoreticians have made a series of simplifying as-
sumptions that do not correspond to marketplace realities. There-
fore, the theories cannot address effectively the question of
whether a contribution rule would be desirable in an actual anti-
trust case. The Supreme Court noted in Hanover Shoe, 70 and
again in Illinois Brick,'7 ' that the economist's simplifying assump-
tions work well with an economist's hypothetical model but gener-
ally must be abandoned when applied to the real economic world.
When contemplating a violation of the antitrust laws, corpo-
rate decisionmakers may weigh the costs and benefits of illegal
conduct. 17 2 Nevertheless, the application of expected value concept




170. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493 (1968).
171. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 742 (1977).
172. But see supra note 150.
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to the actual corporate decisionmaking process is counterintuitive.
First, no rational way to calculate probability of detection exists.
Detection depends largely on the conspirators ability to conceal
their misconduct. This, in turn, depends on the conspirators' abil-
ity to keep their members content and their ability to allay any
suspicion from rivals, customers, government enforcement agen-
cies, and the general public. The probability of detection increases
if the conspiracy is operating in an area under intensive govern-
mental scrutiny. Similarly, if a fellow conspirator becomes disaf-
fected with the conspiracy, detection becomes more probable.
More importantly, these factors can change. Thus, a change in en-
forcement priorities or a change in the relative economic strength
of the conspirators can affect the success of the conspiracy. Indeed,
the success of the cartel may be strengthened or undermined by
events that the conspirators can neither foresee nor control, such
as the outbreak of war among foreign nations or a foreign embargo
of a necessary commodity."' Even if, theoretically, these variable
factors could be measured and quantified, the cost of doing so
would be prohibitive.
Assuming that the probability of detection could be gauged
accurately, detection is only the first step in measuring the
probability of treble damages liability. The likelihood of successful
prosecution must also be taken into account. Litigation is quintes-
sentially unpredictable, particularly when a jury is the factfinder.
Thus, any attempt to quantify probability of success at trial is
highly speculative.
The second element of expected value-anticipated benefits in
the form of overcharges-is also difficult to quantify ex ante. Be-
cause conspiracies rely on secrecy and deception to succeed, par-
ticipants cannot rationally project future monopoly profits in the
same manner as a firm would project profits from an open and le-
gitimate business deal. Real world conspiracies are not analogous
to time-limited business ventures, such as a five-year joint selling
arrangement, in which an end date is certain. Conspiracies operate
in a more serendipitous fashion. Unlike business partners who are
bound contractually to perform, members of a conspiracy may exit
at will and do so when they find their participation no longer use-
ful. The probability of the events' occurrence over which the con-
173. Thus, for example, the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War in 1973 led to severe
cutbacks in petroleum shipments to the United States and skyrocketing oil prices as well.




spirators have no control makes any effort to project total benefits
futile.
In short, a number of factors in the real world, which can be
neither assumed away nor held constant, affect the expected value
of cartel participation. Rather than simplifying the analysis, atten-
tion to the "sound laws of economics" only heightens one's aware-
ness of the difficulties involved in undertaking a cost/benefit analy-
sis of illegal cartel participation.
174
The theoretical analysis is further complicated when the risk
factor is considered. Whether firms are, in fact, risk averse has
generated much scholarly debate but has produced no consen-
sus. 17 A respectable body of literature urges that corporate manag-
ers are risk averse.1 71 On the other hand, since horizontal price-
fixing, the most common form of conspiratorial conduct, may be
prosecuted criminally as well as civilly, 177 perhaps the penology
model of risk preference is the appropriate standard. 78 Yet, an-
other argument could be made for the proposition that firms are
risk neutral. 79 What is most troublesome is that the impact of
contribution on deterrence will vary depending on the view one
adopts as to a firm's attitude toward risk.
A third shortcoming of the theoretical analysis is the rejection
of fairness as a legitimate concern in the contribution debate. The
theoreticians disdain for fairness may be because the concept can-
not be quantified, but surely such an argument cannot be justified.
The fairness argument must be addressed on its merits. 80 It may
be that arguments for contribution based on fairness are unpersua-
sive, but these arguments cannot be ignored.
174. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 742-43 (1977).
175. ABA Contribution Monograph, supra note 2, at 28-29; House Damage Hearings,
supra note 26, at 60 (prepared statement of William F. Baxter) (acknowledging that
whether firms generally are risk averse is "a proposition that produces endless debate
among scholars"); ITDR Hearings, supra note 25, at 18 n.12 (prepared statement of Charles
F. Rule).
176. Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Penalties and Attitudes Toward Risk: An Economic
Analysis, 86 HARv. L. REv. 693, 704-06 (1973) and studies cited therein.
177. In theory, any violation of § 1 may give rise to criminal penalties. In practice,
only egregious violations-horizontal price-fixing and bid rigging-are prosecuted
criminally.
178. House Damage Hearings, supra note 26, at 57 (testimony of William F. Baxter).
179. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3, at 452 n.18 (noting that while this is a theoreti-
cal possibility, practical considerations dictate that "the aversion of risk of individual man-
agers will often influence the firm's activities").
180. See supra notes 122-32 and accompanying text.
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b. Criminal penalties and deterrence
On a more practical level, a serious question exists as to
whether altering the rules with respect to joint and several liability
significantly affects deterrence. The rule of joint and several liabil-
ity is only one mechanism in the arsenal of antitrust enforcement
and deterrence. The successful antitrust plaintiff is entitled to
mandatory treble damages, and liability may be enlarged by use of
the class action procedures. 181 In addition, in egregious cases, such
as horizontal price-fixing and bid rigging, criminal penalties may
be employed. Criminal violations of the Sherman Act are felonies,
punishable with up to three years imprisonment'82 and substantial
fines.183 Treble damages and possible criminal penalties arguably
provide even greater incentives for compliance than the rule of
joint and several liability. 8 4 Unquestionably, the combination of
mandatory treble damages and criminal liability itself provides a
powerful deterrent. Nevertheless, the significance of criminal pen-
alties as a deterrent should not be overemphasized. The suggestion
that criminal liability is the true antitrust deterrent and that the
rule of joint and several liability has little impact on deterrence is
flawed in two respects. First, that position is contrary to the one
taken by other proponents of contribution who maintain that con-
tribution would increase deterrence. 185 Second, criminal penalties,
because they do not attach to all antitrust violations,18 6 cannot be
viewed as a primary deterrent in all antitrust cases. Even when
181. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
182. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 16 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985).
183. Under the Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982),
an individual could have been fined up to $100,000 and a corporation up to $1 million.
However, in 1984, the amount of the fine that could be levied against an individual was
raised to $250,000. Criminal Fines Enforcement Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. ch. 229, § 3623
(Supp. III 1985). More importantly, Congress also provided that an individual or firm may
be fined as high as twice the benefit derived from the wrongdoing or twice the gross loss
inflicted on the victim, unless such a fine would "unduly complicate or prolong the sentenc-
ing process." Id. (governing crimes committed from January 1, 1985 until November 1,
1987). Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3551, effective November 1,
1987, the maximum fine for a criminal violation of the Sherman Act is $250,000.
184. S. REP. No. 359, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-17 (1982); House Damage Hearings,
supra note 26, at 39 (prepared statement of Denis McInerney, attorney, Cahill, Gordon &
Reindel).
185. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
186. Violations of the Sherman Act carry potential criminal exposure. Violations of
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982), as originally promulgated, did not contain crimi-
nal sanctions. However, when the Clayton Act was amended by the Robinson-Patman Act in
1933, criminal sanctions were added for Robinson-Patman offenses only.
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applicable by statute, criminal sanctions are, in practice, utilized
only in the limited category of per se offenses, such as horizontal




Perhaps the more appropriate question is not whether joint
and several liability is ineffective but whether it overdeters because
it may discourage procompetitive conduct. Much as been written
about potential overdeterrence of the private antitrust remedy,
particularly in the context of mandatory treble damages.'88 The
prohibitions of the antitrust laws are far from certain. While there
is a consensus among scholars and practitioners that certain con-
duct, e.g., horizontal price-fixing, is clearly anticompetitive, a far
larger class of cases exists in which the reach of the antitrust laws
is unsettled. 189 Yet, the rule of joint and several liability applies
uniformly to all alleged conspiratorial conduct, even if the joint
conduct is not intended to restrain trade and may in fact have
procompetitive aspects.
The position that joint and several liability overdeters is
flawed in two respects. First, it too is inconsistent with the position
taken by some contribution advocates that contribution would en-
hance deterrence. 90 Second, most contribution proposals' 9' would
apply primarily to horizontal arrangements affecting price. These
naked restraints of trade are both injurious to competition and de-
void of any procompetitive benefits and hence cannot be
overdeterred.1
92
187. See ABA Contribution Monograph, supra note 2, at 350-51 (stating that govern-
ment initiates criminal prosecutions only where violation is "clear and purposeful").
188. See, e.g., Breit & Elzinga, supra note 8, at 428-30; Easterbrook, Detrebling Anti-
trust Damages, 28 J.L. & ECON. 445, 456-57 (1985); R POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN Eco-
NOMIC PERSPECTIVE 228 (1976).
189. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
191. See, e.g., S. 904, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 380, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983);
S. 995, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 4072, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 1242, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 6792, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1980).




3. Settlement and Costs
The arguments that a contribution rule must be rejected be-
cause it would discourage settlements and increase the cost and
complexity of antitrust proceedings are unpersuasive. Unquestion-
ably, damage allocation hearings would lengthen trials and add to
their costs. This fact alone, however, does not compel rejection of
contribution. Indeed, in admiralty cases the Supreme Court has
held that mere difficulty in determining relative fault does not jus-
tify the unfair results generated by a per capita rule of damage
allocation. 9 3 The real question is whether the federal judicial sys-
tem can tolerate lengthier and more expensive trials. The courts
have proven quite capable of resolving contribution issues in secur-
ities cases in which issues of comparable complexity exist.1
9 4
The Supreme Court in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois195 did cau-
tion against introducing issues that would further complicate al-
ready complex antitrust cases, yet that admonition addressed
problems of proof, issues which contribution does not raise. In Illi-
nois Brick the question was whether the courts were equipped to
trace the incidences of overcharges through the chain of distribu-
tion. 98 Because this task would entail making numerous assump-
tions about market behavior and measuring relevant cross-elastici-
ties of demand, which itself would generate a plethora of economic
data, the Court concluded that the additional complexity and spec-
ulativeness would overburden the courts. 97 On the other hand,
contribution requires a measure of relative fault. In many cases,
this determination can be made by using sales data, which, if not
already part of the record, can be discerned with little difficulty.
Nonsales-based formulas may be more complicated to apply, but
do not require detailed economic analyses of the marketplace or
simplifying assumptions.
Any increases in the costs of trial caused by a contribution
rule would fall primarily on defendants and third parties. Contri-
bution issues, however, could be severed and tried separately so as
not to interfere with the plaintiff's main claims.' In addition, de-
193. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975); Sullivan, supra note
14, at 411.
194. See, e.g., Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), afl'd per curiam, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971).
195. 431 U.S. 720, 741 (1977).
196. Id. at 741.
197. Id. at 741-42.
198. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b). But see Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus.,
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termination of contribution issues could be expedited through the
active judicial management techniques espoused in rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure199 and the Manual for Complex
Litigation (Second). °°
A rule of contribution may well alter pretrial strategies and
minimize competition for early "sweetheart" settlements. Some
cases that would have otherwise settled may not settle; other cases
might settle later. Settlement alone cannot justify legal rules that
generate unfair results.20 1 Given the incentives to settle, which ex-
ist wholly apart from concerns about joint and several liability, it is
unlikely that the uncertainties interjected by contribution would
significantly alter the percentage of pretrial settlements in anti-
trust cases.2 °2 Judicial experience in applying comparative negli-
gence principles supports this view. 203 Contribution does not ap-
pear to have deterred settlements in securities cases.20 4 In sum, a
rule of contribution may increase the length of trials and change
settlement strategies, but these changes alone are not a sufficient
basis to maintain the present system.
Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 906 (5th Cir.) (stating that "allowance of third-party claims may open a
Pandora's box of procedural problems against which district court discretion may prove a
palliation"), aff'd, 451 U.S. 630 (1981); House Damage Hearings, supra note 26, at 253 (sub-
mission by Hon. Judge Hubert L. Will) (arguing that "contribution and claim reduction
would create immense additional management problems").
199. Rule 16 encourages courts to establish early control over litigation to prevent
wasteful pretrial activities and protracted proceedings. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a). The rule re-
quires the court to enter a scheduling order that sets deadlines for joinder of parties and
completion of discovery. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b). In addition, courts are encouraged to use
pretrial conferences to formulate and limit issues, to limit unnecessary proof, to explore
settlement, and to determine the need for special procedures to handle complex issues or
unusual proof problems. FED. R CIv. P. 16(c).
200. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SEcoND), reprinted in 1 J. MOORE, W. TAG-
GART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 (1986). The Manual contains practical
guidance for the court in controlling and managing complex litigation. Among other things,
the manual discusses limitations on presentation of proof, narrowing of issues, evaluation of
economic data, and use of in limine hearings.
201. See United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 408 (1975) (stating that
"[c]ongestion in the courts cannot justify a legal rule that produces unjust results in litiga-
tion simply to encourage speedy out-of-court accommodations"); Sullivan, supra note 14, at
416.
202. See House Damage Hearings, supra note 26, at 141 (prepared statement of Rob-
ert P. Taylor).
203. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 408 n.13 (1975) (observing
that the rule of comparative negligence "does not appear to discourage the negotiation of
settlements").
204. See Sullivan, supra note 14, at 411 (recognizing that "since 1933, in fact, federal
trial courts have been able to successfully apply a contribution rule established under the
securities laws").
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D. The Ideal Rule
Assuming that a contribution rule is desirable in the antitrust
field, the ideal rule would: (1) fairly allocate damages among de-
fendants without impairing the plaintiffs' right to recover the en-
tire damages amount; (2) be simple to comprehend and inexpen-
sive to administer; (3) be predictable; and (4) have minimal impact
on deterrence. Unfortunately, the goals of equity, efficiency, pre-
dictability, and deterrence frequently conflict and are therefore
difficult to harmonize in practice. For example, it may be equitable
to allocate damages among defendants based on their relative re-
sponsibility for initiating the illegal conduct; the cost of establish-
ing relative responsibility, however, may be prohibitively expen-
sive. Moreover, a relative responsibility standard may not only be
unpredictable but also may allow defendants who had been minor
players but major beneficiaries in the conspiracy to retain a por-
tion of its ill-gotten gains, which impairs deterrence.
Similarly, a fair contribution standard might impair deter-
rence. Deterrence may be weakened if price-fixers are permitted to
allocate damages among themselves rather than face liability for
all damages inflicted by a conspiracy." 5
The inevitable conflict among the various goals of the ideal
rule make its implementation impossible; trade-offs must be made.
The contribution debate focuses upon the extent to which the vari-
ous aims of antitrust enforcement should be sacrificed in creating a
contribution rule. Congress' approach to contribution has been
pragmatic, if not unsophisticated.20 6 Contribution adherents have
been unable to forge a favorable consensus in Congress without a
standard that allows acceptable trade-offs between fairness, effi-
ciency, predictability, and deterrence.
E. The Legislative Response
As early as 1979, prior to the Supreme Court's refusal to read
a contribution rule into other antitrust statutes, 0 7 Congress con-
sidered legislation proposing to modify the no-contribution rule in
private antitrust actions. 0 That bill, like those that have been in-
troduced in succeeding Congresses'" failed to pass. Contribution
205. See supra note 103.
206. See infra notes 220-53 and accompanying text.
207. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981).
208. S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
209. S. 904, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 380, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 995,
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advocates might have succeeded in 1982 with Senate Bill 995 if
Congress could have resolved the issue of retroactive application of
any remedial statute.21 Congress considered the proposed contri-
bution statute while several major antitrust cases were pending;21'
those having a stake in these cases beseeched members of Congress
to either include or exclude their cases from the bill's coverage.
21 2
These excessive lobbying efforts apparently dismayed legislators
and ultimately doomed the bill.21 3
1. Conduct Covered
With two exceptions,21 the contribution proposals considered
by Congress have been limited to price-fixing cases.215 The appar-
ent justification for limiting contribution to price-fixing cases is
that unfairness and abusive tactics'are most widespread in price-
fixing cases.216 This limitation is easy to apply, predictable, and
narrowly targeted to correct an identified problem. It creates, how-
ever, the anomalous situation of providing potentially significant
benefits only to those defendants who have engaged in the most
egregious of antitrust offenses. At the same time, the limitation de-
nies contribution to defendants whose conduct is neither per se un-
lawful nor necessarily devoid of procompetitive benefits. This ap-
proach may underdeter naked restraints of trade but overdeter
possibly illegal conduct-conduct that is not clearly legal or clearly
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 2244, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983); H.R. 5794, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 4072, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981);
H.R. 1242, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 6792, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
210. 43 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1093, at 1055 (Dec. 9, 1982) (noting
that "although legislators seemed favorably disposed toward the basic objective of the legis-
lation, S. 995 was doomed by an amendment to extend relief to defendants in pending
cases").
211. See, e.g., In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., M.D.L. No. 310 (S.D. Tex.);
In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., M.D.L. No. 159 (E.D. La.); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Milli-
ken & Co., 690 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 914 (1983).
212. 43 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1093, at 1055 (Dec. 9, 1982); see
supra note 16 and accompanying text.
213. 43 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1093, at 1055 (Dec. 9, 1982).
214. H.R. 2244, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.R. 5794, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
These two bills applied to any damages action brought by private persons, the federal gov-
ernment, or state government parens patriae.
215. S. 904, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 380, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 995,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 2244, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983); H.R. 4072, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 1242, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981);
H.R. 6792, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
216. Indeed, a review of the congressional hearings reveals that the case for contribu-
tion has been based largely on the experience of certain smaller defendants. In re Corru-
gated Container Antitrust Litig., M.D.L. No. 310 (S.D. Tex.).
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illegal-that may promote competition.217 Indeed, opponents of
contribution focus on this anomaly and characterize this legislation
as the "price-fixers relief act." '218
In addition, the superficial simplicity of a contribution rule
limited to price-fixing is deceiving. When methods for allocating
damages are considered, this narrow rule may be far more compli-
cated and less predictable than it initially appears.
219
2. Damage Allocation Formulas
Several different formulas may be used to allocate damages
among defendants. These proposals focus on the following: sales,
relative responsibility, per capita allocation, and judicial discretion.
Congress 220 and the Department of Justice2 21 favor a sales-based
approach. The American Bar Association suggests allocating dam-
ages based on relative responsibility. 222 The Department of Justice
endorses this approach in nonhorizontal conspiracy cases. 223 The
per capita approach is borrowed from tort law.224 In addition, a
fourth approach, to leave the allocation to the court's discretion,
has some scholarly225 and congressional 226 support. Each of these
formulations has benefits and drawbacks; none is perfect. A
formula that is fairest to all defendants may be complex and costly
to administer; but a simple, inexpensive formula may prove to be
inequitable.227
a. Sales
Apportioning damages based on sales is usually a straightfor-
ward exercise in horizontal price-fixing cases. Sales data is
normally readily available, and each defendant's share of supra-
competitive sales can be calculated easily. In simple vertical price-
217. ABA Contribution Monograph, supra note 2, at 45.
218. House Damage Hearings, supra note 26, at 15 (testimony of Stephen D. Susman).
219. See infra notes 220-47 and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., S. 995, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979);
H.R. 4072, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 1242, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
221. See House Damage Hearings, supra note 26, at 65-67.
222. ABA Contribution Monograph, supra note 2, app. A, at 42.
223. House Damage Hearings, supra note 26, at 66-67.
224. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 1(b), 12 U.L.A. 63 (1975). The per
capita method also has some judicial support. See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Na-
tional Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 1979).
225. See Sullivan, supra note 14, at 421.
226. See H.R. 2244, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
227. ABA Contribution Monograph, supra note 2, at 41-44.
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fixing conspiracies, the plaintiff is dealing only with one seller, and
therefore contribution is not applicable. The formula is more diffi-
cult to apply when the price-fixing conspiracy has both horizontal
and vertical elements. Distinguishing sales that were caused by
horizontal price-fixing from sales that were caused by vertical
price-fixing may be impractical or impossible. The costs of allocat-
ing damages undoubtedly would exceed the benefits. Finally, in ar-
eas in which the conspiracy does not operate to affect price, such
as concerted refusals to deal, sales-based formulas may not accu-
rately mirror the relative degree of participation in the conspiracy.
Moreover, even in horizontal conspiracies to affect price, a
sales-based formula may be underinclusive. For example, when de-
fendants seek to raise prices by conspiratorial refusals to bid or by
agreeing to submit phony bids to maintain a facade of competition,
apportionment by sales is inappropriate. A sales-based approach
punishes only "winning" bidders and therefore is inequitable. De-
fendants who never made sales but who benefitted from the con-
spiracy are not held accountable for illicit gains. The sales-based
approach is also inequitable in that it implicitly assumes that
blameworthiness relates to the volume of sales at supracompetitive
prices.228 This view ignores the presence of ringleaders whose im-
pact on the conspiracy is not reflected in sales.229 Using sales as a
yardstick also may prove cumbersome when a defendant's
overcharges were not constant and varied from customer to
customer.
A sales formulation also fails when plaintiffs claim damages
under the so-called "umbrella theory" of damages. The umbrella
theory permits plaintiffs to recover "overcharges" imposed by non-
defendants on the theory that the conspiracy has created an um-
brella which supports higher prices by rival sellers not part of the
conspiracy.23° A sales-based allocation obviously does include salesby those who are neither defendants nor conspirators.
228. Id. at 42.
229. Id.
230. The courts are split as to whether a plaintiff that purchases from a nonconspiring
competitor, who has been able to inflate prices artificially under defendants' price umbrella,
may recover these "overcharges" from defendants. See In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig.,
600 F.2d 1148, 1166 n.24 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980); In re Arizona
Dairy Prods. Antitrust Litig., 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,895 (D. Ariz. 1985); Washington
v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 274 F. Supp. 961 (W.D. Wash. 1968) (accepting umbrella
theory). But see Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573 (3d





Allocating damages according to relative responsibility focuses
on each conspirator's degree of culpability. Culpability is not nec-
essarily coextensive with the benefits derived from overcharges im-
posed in a price-fixing conspiracy. 31 Apportionment based on rela-
tive responsibility may allocate damages more equitably than a
sales-based formula. At the same time, however, determining rela-
tive responsibility is far more expensive than determining sales. A
sales-based formula normally would be more efficient and therefore
preferable in horizontal conspiracies affecting price.
Relative responsibility, nevertheless, is more appropriate in
those horizontal cases in which sales-based formulas are inade-
quate-such as bid-rigging cases and those employing the umbrella
theory of damages-and in nonprice-fixing horizontal cases. The
application of a relative responsibility formula is complex." 2 The
main question is what criteria the factfinder must take into ac-
count in establishing each defendant's degree of culpability. Possi-
ble factors include: the length of participation in the conspiracy,
the role in organizing or sustaining the conspiracy, the steps taken
to conceal the existence of the conspiracy and the identity of its
participants, the benefits derived from the conspiracy, and the
harm inflicted by anticompetitive acts in furtherance of the con-
spiracy. These factors are difficult to quantify, and the factfinder
faces a monumental task in applying them. Although a relative re-
sponsibility standard seems the fairest allocation device in theory,
in practice it may be both arbitrary and expensive.
c. Per capita
A third alternative is per capita apportionment of damages. 33
Under this system, a defendant's share of damages is determined
by dividing total damages by the number of conspirators. A per
capita formula is simple to apply and inexpensive to administer.
The court need only determine that a particular defendant partici-
pated in a conspiracy; it need not establish degrees of culpability
as it would under a relative responsibility standard. Because the
per capita approach provides certainty of liability, it may enhance
231. See ABA Contribution Monograph, supra note 2, at 41-44.
232. See Scott, supra note 136.
233. See, e.g., UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 1(b), 12 U.L.A. 63
(1975).
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deterrence and foster early settlement.234
On the other hand, a per capita scheme may be unfair pre-
cisely because it fails to recognize the actors' differing degrees of
culpability. This rule produces especially harsh results for a very
small company marginally involved in a conspiracy with very large
companies." 5 In a recent admiralty case2 36 the Supreme Court sup-
ported a relative responsibility standard over a per capita stan-
dard. The Court observed that "[a] rule that divides damages by
degree of fault would seem better designed to induce care than the
rule of equally divided damages, because it imposes the strongest
deterrent upon the wrongful behavior that is most likely to harm
others. 23 7 The per capita allocation has been criticized in the se-
curities area as well.
238
d. Judicial discretion
Under H.R. 2244,239 a court may reduce damages payable by a
culpable defendant or allocate damages among that defendant and
234. See Scott, supra note 136, at 256.
235. ABA Contribution Monograph, supra note 2, at 43-44.
236. United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
237. Id. at 405 n.11.
238. See Scott, supra note 136, at 256 n.188 (noting that "[t]he per capita rule has
been said to produce results 'characterized by more mathematical than judicial integrity' ").
Professor Scott observed that:
The arguments in favor of per capita and relative fault under the securities laws are in
equipoise. The incremental deterrent effect of one over the other does not seem amena-
ble to empirical verification. While the courts strain for equitable solutions, they have
been perfectly willing to impose a per capita allocation, in some cases without discus-
sion. Where the courts use relative fault concepts, they do so with little analysis. Both
methods are accepted mechanisms to encourage performance of the due diligence re-
quired under the federal securities acts. The principal advantage of a per capita rule is
its ease of administration. The principal advantage of a relative fault rule is its promo-
tion of notions of fairness.
Id.
239. H.R. 2244, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). Section 3 of that bill provides:
Reduction of Damage Awards
Sec. 3. The Clayton Act is amended by inserting after section 41, as added by
section 2 of this Act, the following new section:
"Reduction of Monetary Relief
"Sec. 4J(a)(1) In an action under section 4, 4A, or 4C, after determination of the
amount of any monetary relief which would be awarded in the absence of this section,
the amount of such monetary relief shall be reduced, or allocated between the defend-
ant and any other defendants found liable in the action for the injury, if it is deter-
mined on a motion promptly made that the amount would be substantially unjust with
respect to a defendant.
"(2)(A) A reduction or allocation under paragraph (1) may diminish the defend-
ant's liability to an amount less than the plaintiff's unrecovered actual damages only if
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other culpable defendants upon a finding that the amount of dam-
ages would be substantially unjust. A court may not reduce the
defendant's liability to an amount less than the plaintiff's unrecov-
ered actual damages unless the court finds that the plaintiff's con-
duct coniributed significantly to the substantial injustice.4 0 Fur-
thermore, any reduction or allocation may not reduce the
defendant's liability to an amount less than treble the damages
fairly attributable to the defendant's conduct or treble the defend-
ant's sales or purchases from the plaintiff.241
This approach would maintain the current damage allocation
system but would permit reallocation of damages by the court in
those exceptional circumstances in which unfairness otherwise
would result. Plaintiffs would have a strong incentive to name all
putatively culpable parties as defendants. If the plaintiffs failed to
name all culpable parties then they would risk allocations against a
given defendant that would be less than their unrecovered actual
damages. This risk arises because the failure to name all prospec-
tive culprits may contribute significantly to a substantially unjust
damage allocation. 42 The proposal would eliminate situations in
which the most culpable defendants escape suit by coercing plain-
tiffs not to sue them, which leaves the named defendants liable for
excessive damages. 43 Moreover, unlike most of its predecessors,
the bill's coverage would not be limited to price-fixing cases.
Nevertheless, the bill has two principal flaws. First, the "sub-
stantially unjust" criterion is vague and might encourage introduc-
tion of voluminous evidence that would lengthen and complicate
the trial. The standard is also unpredictable and may yield con-
flicting precedents. Without stricter guidelines, this standard may
it is determined that the plaintiff's conduct of the action significantly contributed to
the substantial injustice.
"(B) A reduction or allocation under this subsection shall not diminish the defend-
ant's liability to an amount less than threefold the damages fairly attributable to the
conduct of the defendant, or the defendant's sales to or purchases from the plaintiff.
"(b) A determination under subsection (a) shall be made by the court unless doing





242. H.R. 2244, unlike other contribution proposals, puts the onus on the plaintiff to
include all potentially liable firms as defendants. See also S. 1300, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1985) (proposing that under the individual treble damage responsibility approach, joint and
several liability would be abolished and thus plaintiff would have to sue all firms from which
it wanted to collect damages).
243. See Sullivan, supra note 14, at 421.
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ultimately prove unworkable. Second, in quantifying the limits of
any reduction or allocation, the bill proposes either relative fault or
sales as a standard. Yet, it offers no guidelines on whose relative
fault is to be determined. The relative fault standard may prove
arbitrary and costly to implement. "
Professor Thomas Sullivan has proposed a slightly different
approach to judicial discretion in damage allocation.24 5 He con-
tends that contribution ought to be allowed only in non-per se
cases against violators of equal or greater fault.24 6 Sullivan, how-
ever, would grant the courts discretion to allow contribution in or-
der to "deny economically influential defendants the opportunity
to escape liability by coercing plaintiffs into agreeing not to sue
them. 214 7 The Sullivan approach on discretion is less sweeping
than H.R. 2244 but shares a common premise that damage alloca-
tion is appropriate when the plaintiff's conduct results in substan-
tial unfairness to a given defendant.
3. Claim Reduction and Contribution
Each contribution proposal entertained by Congress has also
included a claim reduction provision.248 These "carve out" formu-
lations have been virtually identical 249 and would provide that
when a defendant settles, the plaintiff's claims shall be reduced by
the greatest of: (1) any amount stipulated by the plaintiff's release
or covenant not to sue; (2) the amount of consideration actually
244. See supra note 232 and accompanying text.
245. See Sullivan, supra note 14, at 421.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. S. 904, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 380, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 995,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 2244, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1983); H.R. 5794, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. 4072, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981);
H.R. 1242, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 6792, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
249. Two bills do have different formulations. H.R. 2244 would leave any damage allo-
cation to the court's discretion by providing that a court reduce a damage award or allocate
damages among culpable defendants if it finds that the amount of damages imposed in ab-
sence of contribution would be "substantially unjust." H.R. 2244, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 4J(a)(1) (1983). In addition, H.R. 5794 varies slightly from the usual formulation. It
provides:
"(e) In any action under section 4, 4A, or 4C of this Act, the court shall reduce the
claim of any person releasing any person from liability or potential liability for dam-
ages by the greatest of-
"(1) any amount stipulated for this purpose;
"(2) the amount of the consideration paid for the release; or
"(3) the contribution share of the person released."
H.R. 5794, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 41(e) (1982).
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paid in settlement; or (3) treble the actual damages attributable to
the defendant's sales or purchases of goods and services. 250 Current
law allows only the actual amount of settlement to be subtracted
from a plaintiff's total trebled damages.251 Claim reduction thus
has been viewed as an integral part of any contribution scheme.
Contribution would permit a defendant who has paid an antitrust
judgment to proceed against those jointly liable, and recover from
them amounts representing their fair share of liability. Ordinarily
a party who has settled is immune from any contribution claim.252
Claim reduction carves out from the claims against nonsettling de-
fendants the portion of the claims attributable to the settling de-
fendants. The combination of contribution and claim reduction
thus assures that a nonsettling defendant faces exposure only for
its fair share of damages, irrespective of whether co-conspirators
choose to litigate or settle. Claim reduction alone may diminish a
nonsettling defendant's damage exposure and thereby weaken de-
terrence.253 The combination of contribution and claim reduction
may significantly impair deterrence and undermine the private an-
titrust damage remedy.
F. Alternatives to Contribution
1. Individual Treble Damage Responsibility
A proposed alternative to contribution is the abolition of joint
and several liability. Ira Millstein and Griffin Bell have been the
most notable proponents of this alternative, known as Individual
Treble Damage Responsibility ("ITDR").254 A bill embodying the
ITDR approach was introduced in the Senate in 1985 and subse-
quently approved by the Judiciary Committee255 but not debated
on the Senate floor. As with most contribution proposals, ITDR
250. Trebling would not apply to government suits brought under 15 U.S.C. § 15a.
See, e.g., S. 995, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 41(b) (1982).
251. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 348 (1971);
Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 397-98 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
252. Without such a provision, parties would have little incentive to settle, since they
could be brought back into the suit by impleader. See Scott, supra note 136, at 264 (noting
that under securities laws, settlement does not bar subsequent contribution claims; but
courts are, nevertheless, not inclined to disturb settlements).
253. See infra notes 260-68 and accompanying text.
254. See Moore, supra note 23, at 2, col. 1. See generally, Millstein, Birrell & Kessler,
supra note 38, at 975-80 (describing ITDR and its advantages over other damage allocation
proposals).
255. S. 1300, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
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would be limited to conspiracies affecting price. 56 Generally, each
defendant would be responsible to the plaintiff for overcharges
attributable only to its sales. Joint and several liability would be
retained, however, in cases involving sales by a defendant who is
beyond the jurisdiction of United States courts or who lacks the
financial capacity to satisfy its portion of the judgment. 5 '
ITDR offers an advantage over the present system by reducing
the likelihood of unfair whipsaw settlement tactics and dispropor-
tionately high judgments against defendants who lose at trial. In
addition, ITDR is far less complicated than contribution, which
may necessitate lengthy and complex cross-claims or impleader.
The key difference between ITDR and contribution is that
under ITDR the burden is on the plaintiff to sue all parties from
whom it wishes to collect damages. If a plaintiff does not sue a
given defendant, it cannot recover overcharges based on that
defendant's sales. Under a contribution rule, the burden is on
defendants to implead or bring subsequent actions against any
alleged conspirators not named as defendants. With contribution,
plaintiffs thus can avoid suing conspirators whom they favor, yet
collect the entire amount of damages due from named defendants.
ITDR denies plaintiffs this tactical edge. Nor could plaintiffs
under ITDR enter into sweetheart settlements with favored de-
fendants. Thus, early settlements may be discouraged.
More importantly, ITDR, like most contribution proposals, is
defective because it relieves the most egregious of antitrust offend-
ers-price-fixers-from joint and several liability, while paradoxi-
cally subjecting less culpable defendants to joint and several liabil-
ity.258 It is not clear how ITDR applies to bid rigging cases in
which defendants have agreed not to bid against each other. Nor is
it clear how ITDR applies when a conspiracy has both horizontal
and vertical aspects. In general, ITDR suffers from substantially
the same defects as contribution and may disadvantage plaintiffs
to an even greater extent than other forms of damage allocation.
2. Claim Reduction Without Contribution
Another proposal that has received serious attention from
scholars "59 but little attention from Congress is claim reduction
256. Id. § 41(a).
257. Id. § 41(b).
258. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
259. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3.
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without contribution.2 0 Claim reduction provisions included with
contribution schemes carve out from plaintiffs' claims against non-
settling defendants the greatest of either: the amount stipulated in
the settlement agreement; the actual amount of settlement; or the
trebled actual damages attributable to the settling defendant's
sales or purchases.26'
Several methods for calculating actual damages attributable to
the settling defendant's sales or purchases have been proposed.262
If the prices were fixed uniformly by defendants and all conspira-
tors participated in the conspiracy for the same length of time, the
amount would be calculated by multiplying the plaintiffs' actual
damages by the settling defendant's share of total price-fixed
sales.263 If the prices charged were not uniform and the identity of
conspirators and length of participation varied, the amount of
claim reduction might be based on the settling defendant's sales to
the plaintiffs considering certain factors, including the extent of
the violation, its duration, and the transactions affected.26' If the
settling defendant had no sales to the plaintiffs, the actual amount
of settlement is deducted from the treble damage award.265
Early claim reduction proposals, because they had been
drafted as part of contribution schemes applicable only to price-
fixing cases, had sales-based carve-out formulas. Recent claim re-
duction plans, designed to have broad application to all antitrust
suits, have based carve-out provisions on a relative fault concept
when sales-based formulas are inapposite. 6
Claim reduction is not a perfect solution to the perceived
problems created by the combined effects of mandatory trebling
and joint and several liability, yet this approach offers significant
advantages over contribution (with or without a claim reduction
feature) and ITDR. The primary benefit of claim reduction is that
its impact on the equilibrium between plaintiffs and defendants in
private antitrust litigation is less profound and hence less disrup-
tive than either contribution or ITDR. First, it lessens the likeli-
260. Claim reduction without contribution was proposed as part of the Reagan Admin-
istration's 1986 antitrust legislative package. See S. 2162, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 401 (1986).
A virtually identical bill has been introduced into the 100th Congress. See S. 539, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1155, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
261. See supra notes 248-50 and accompanying text.
262. See S. REP. No. 359, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-29 (1982).
263. Id. at 28.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 29.
266. See infra notes 285-299 and accompanying text.
1324 [Vol. 40:1277
ANTITRUST REFORM
hood of whipsaw tactics without impairing the rule of joint and
several liability. Thus, plaintiffs could not, as they could under the
present law, negotiate sweetheart settlements from the more culpa-
ble defendants and use those settlements as levers to exact higher
settlements from the remaining defendants by exposing the non-
settling defendants to greater risk in the form of added liability to
the extent of the discounts granted in the sweetheart settlements.
Under claim reduction, nonsettling defendants could not be held
liable for these discounts. If a settlement is less than the defend-
ant's actual share of liability, a plaintiff's claim would be reduced
by the larger amount.
A second benefit of claim reduction is ease of application.
Claim reduction, unlike contribution and ITDR, can be applied in
virtually every antitrust case. Contribution and ITDR are un-
wieldy, if not unworkable, outside the horizontal area, and hence
are limited largely to price-fixing offenses. Claim reduction may
complicate matters when relative fault is the basis of excluding
damages, but this does not create significant difficulties because
many antitrust suits involve horizontal price-fixing when liability
based on sales is easily calculated and even when price-fixing is not
involved, a sales-based formula may in some instances serve as a
surrogate for relative fault.
In addition, a claim reduction approach eliminates the anom-
aly that exists with contribution and ITDR: price-fixers, whose
conduct is without redeeming value, are favored while those ac-
cused of far less serious antitrust infractions receive no benefit.
Thus, claim reduction cannot simultaneously subsidize price-fixers
and chill potentially procompetitive behavior.
Third, adoption of claim reduction will not significantly add to
the burdens of the courts. When the determination of relative fault
is required, the courts would have to make additional findings. Un-
like contribution, however, claim reduction does not necessitate
hearings on cross-claims, third party claims, or separate proceed-
ings to reallocate damages. When the damage phase of an action is
reached, all settlements will have been consummated.
This is not to say that a claim reduction approach is without
drawbacks. It does not totally eliminate whipsaw settlement tac-
tics; a plaintiff is still free to choose defendants and may opt not to
sue a major conspirator or decline to settle with certain defendants
who have made significant sales at supracompetitive prices. This
problem, however, can be mitigated by requiring plaintiffs to join
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as defendants all alleged conspirators.267 In addition, claim reduc-
tion would tend to lessen the deterrent function of antitrust suits
by lessening the uncertainty of defendants as to their liability. To
the extent that defendants' liability becomes more certain, defend-
ants, in theory, can better evaluate the risks of their wrongdoing.
However, the adverse impact on deterrence in the case of claim
reduction is far less than the impact would be under contribution
or ITDR because in the latter cases a defendant is liable only to
the extent of its own wrongdoing whereas under claim reduction,
joint and several liability is preserved for the nonsettling
defendants.
Finally, because claim reduction lessens the likelihood of
sweetheart settlements, it may slow down the settlement process.
Plaintiffs, in particular, would be more circumspect about settle-
ment, delaying any overtures until they were sure how much would
be carved out of their claims by agreeing to settle. Indeed, claim
reduction may tend to slow down the disposition process, but it
would not present a significant hurdle. There are significant incen-
tives to settle any case, wholly apart from damage allocation.68
Settlements reached under a claim reduction rule, in fact, may be
fairer than those agreed upon under the present system.
Claim reduction alone is far less disruptive than contribution
alone, contribution with claim reduction, or ITDR and would pro-
vide important benefits without significantly altering the balance
of power between plaintiffs and defendants. Claim reduction alone
is therefore preferable to contribution or ITDR.
3. Sharing Agreements
Another approach is to reject congressionally imposed damage
allocation formulas and allow defendants to allocate liability
among themselves 269 through sharing agreements. The case law
pertaining to sharing agreements is sparse, but generally the agree-
ments are assumed to be valid 270 and have been used effectively to
267. The Antitrust Remedies Improvement Act of 1986: Hearings on S. 2162 Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1986) (statement of Douglas H.
Ginsburg).
268. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
269. See In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., No. 80-3479 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 10, 1981)
(denying plaintiff's motion to void defendants' sharing agreement), aff'd, 681 F.2d 514 (7th
Cir. 1982); see also Cranston & Kingdon, Judgment Sharing Agreements, 1985 Research
Project of the Civil Practice and Procedure Committee, ABA SEc. ANTITRUST L. 6 (1985).
270. S. REP. No. 359, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982); House Damage Hearings, supra
note 26, at 7 (statement of A. Stephens Clay); id. at 135 (statement of Robert P. Taylor); id.
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avoid the problems of whipsawing.2 71 In theory, sharing agreements
may serve as effective substitutes for statutory damage allocation.
In practice, however, defendants may not be eager to join in such
pacts, particularly when the defendants vary in size and potential
liability. In that case, deep-pocket defendants and those with the
largest exposure, who may be one and the same, may prefer to seek
an early, sweetheart settlement as a way of minimizing damages.
Marginal defendants have no way of forcing the principal players
into a sharing arrangement. Sharing agreements can work in the
rare cases in which all of the defendants are more or less equal in
size and culpability or when all defendants feel comfortable with a
common defense. Thus, sharing agreements, although useful in cer-
tain cases, do not offer a panacea.
IV. A NEW APPROACH TO DAMAGE ALLOCATION
The inconclusiveness of the contribution debate serves to un-
derscore the complexity of the issues involved. Some scholars sug-
gest that the inconclusive nature of the debate is reason to main-
tain the present system because the proponents of change have
failed to meet their "burden of proof.12 72 But, this approach misses
the mark, particularly when one considers that the debate has pro-
ceeded under the assumption that the mandatory treble damages
provision of section four of the Clayton Act 27 ' ought to be left in-
tact. Rather than conclude the debate, the stalemate on damage
allocation invites inquiries into other avenues of reform to relieve
the perceived ills of the private antitrust enforcement system. This
section offers a different approach to the damage allocation issue
and proposes that the problems associated with private antitrust
damage suits-fairness, the proper deterrence level, and effi-
ciency-can be better addressed by selective detrebling rather than
through mandatory treble damages with contribution, claim reduc-
tion, or ITDR.
at 266 (statement of Hon. Judge Hubert L. Will); id. at 231 (letter of Charles B. Renfrew,
attorney, Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro); id. at 444 (letter of Denis P. McInerney); id. at 474
(letter of James F. Rill, attorney, Collier, Shannon, Rill & Scott).
271. For example, in the In re Antibiotics Antitrust Cases, the five defendants en-
tered into a sharing agreement and thereby avoided any "rush to settlement."
272. Easterbrook, Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 368.
273. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
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A. Detrebling: A Synopsis
The debate surrounding contribution, claim reduction, and
ITDR is of relatively recent origin, yet the appropriateness of
mandatory treble damages has been questioned from time to time
since 1890.274 Nevertheless, scholarly criticism of mandatory treb-
ling has emerged only in the last fifteen years. Critics have agreed
that mandatory trebling for all antitrust violations may be un-
fair2 75 and may overdeter conduct that has significant procompeti-
tive potential by discouraging traders from engaging in practices
that fall near the ill-defined line between legality and illegality.
7 6
As early as 1983, officials of the Reagan Administration proposed
that mandatory trebling be abolished.277 In 1986, and again in
1987, the Administration offered and Congress considered identical
detrebling proposals as part of a package of reforms in private an-
titrust actions.27 s
While there are those who would retain mandatory trebling in
all cases, 79 there is also a significant body of scholars and practi-
tioners who would eliminate mandatory trebling.28 In this latter
274. For example, within eight years after the passage of the Sherman Act, Represen-
tative William Greene of Nebraska proposed limiting private recoveries to double damages.
In 1908 Representative William Hepburn proposed that multiple damages be abolished alto-
gether. K. ELZINGA & W. BREIT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES 65-66 (1976). More recently, Rep-
resentative Chauncey Reed advocated making treble damages discretionary with the court.
Discretionary Treble Damages in Private Antitrust Suits: Hearings on H.R. 4597 Before
Subcomm. No. 3, of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Serial No. 8, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-
8 (1953) (testimony of Rep. Chauncey W. Reed). Similarly, discretionary trebling was rec-
ommended in the 1955 Attorney General's Report. See Report of the Attorney General's
National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 378-79 (1955). See generally K. ELZINGA &
W. BREIT, supra; HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, CONGRESS AND THE MONOPOLY
PROBLEM, FIFTY YEARS OF ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENT, 1900-1950: A HISTORY OF CONGRES-
SIONAL ACTION IN THE ANTITRUST FIELD DURING THE PAST FIFTY YEARS; H.R. Doc. No. 599,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 35-42 (1950).
275. See, e.g., City Bar Report on Treble Damages, supra note 70, at 654-55.
276. R. POSNER, supra note 188, at 228; Breit & Elzinga, supra note 8, at 428-30;
Easterbrook, supra note 188, at 456-57.
277. 44 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep (BNA) No. 1108, at 713 (Mar. 31, 1983); Hershey,
Antitrust Law Limits Proposed, New York Times, Mar. 30, 1983, at D1, col. 5.
278. S. 539, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1155, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S.
2162, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
279. See 132 CONG. REC. S1397-98 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986) (statement of Rep. Peter
Rodino).
280. City Bar Report on Treble Damages, supra note 70; II P. AREEDA & D. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW 151 (1978); Breit & Elzinga, supra note 8, at 428-30; Easterbrook, supra
note 188, at 456-57; R. POSNER, supra note 188, at 228; Baumol & Ordover, Use of Antitrust
Laws to Subvert Competition, 28 J.L. & ECON. 247, 253 (1985) (stating that the "case
against trebled damages is far from clear-cut"); Goldschmid, Comment on the Policy Impli-
cations of the Georgetown Study 8 (Georgetown Conference on Private Antitrust Litigation
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group, some have even proposed the abolition of the private rem-
edy,281 but most would retain the private claim and even treble
damages in certain cases.282 The problem that arises in the selec-
tive detrebling approach is easy to state but far more difficult to
resolve: how do you identify the cases in which trebling is still ap-
propriate? A number of attempts to delineate the categories of
cases in which trebling remains beneficial have been made. A de-
tailed analysis of all of the various detrebling proposals is beyond
the scope of this article,283 but a listing of the suggestions is
instructive:
24
1. Detrebling only in "per se" cases;
2. Detrebling when defendant has no reason to believe con-
duct was unlawful;
3. Detrebling in class actions;
4. Trebling only when specific intent to violate the antitrust
laws is proven;
5. Treble only when covert acts are involved;
6. Trebling damages to defendants but awarding plaintiffs
only actual damages (de-coupling damages from the
remedy);
7. Trebling only up to a certain amount and permitting only
actual damages beyond that amount;
8. Permitting plaintiff the option of pursuing either treble
or actual damages at the risk of facing liability for attor-
neys' fees if unsuccessful in seeking treble damages;
9. Trebling when overcharges or undercharges are involved;
10. Permitting up to treble damages at the discretion of the
court.
Nov. 8, 1985); see also Antitrust Remedies Reform: Hearings on S. 2162 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1986) (statement of Douglas H. Ginsburg)
(stating that "after 90 years, there is good reason to believe that some adjustments [in anti-
trust remedies] are necessary"); Japanese Technological Advances and Possible United
States Responses Using Research Joint Ventures: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on In-
vestigations and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Science, Research and Technology of the
House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 159 (1983) (testimony of
William F. Baxter).
281. Austin, Negative Effects of Treble Damage Actions: Reflections on the New An-
titrust Strategy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1353, 1372.
282. See supra note 239.





While some of these approaches are better than others, each
has its negative aspects. The detrebling and contribution debates
are similar in several respects. First, each provides solutions about
which reasonable persons might differ. Thus, none of the alterna-
tives is ideal. Second, the detrebling and contribution controversies
have proceeded largely in isolation of each other. The contribution
debate has proceeded under the assumption that mandatory treble
damages would remain viable: the detrebling debate has proceeded
under the assumption of the no-contribution rule's continued exis-
tence. Thus, detrebling and damage allocation have been widely
perceived as alternative means of reform. Nevertheless, two ap-
proaches merit more detailed discussion: (1) detrebling in all cases
not involving overcharges or undercharges; and (2) discretionary
detrebling. Detrebling in all cases not involving overcharges or un-
dercharges merits further discussion because that proposal was
made a part of the antitrust remedies reform package now pending
before Congress that contains a claim reduction provision. There-
fore, this new proposal recognizes that detrebling and claim reduc-
tion are complementary, rather than alternative means of damage
allocation reform. 85 Discretionary detrebling merits further discus-
sion because this approach eliminates the perceived unfairness of
mandatory trebling without adversely affecting deterrence and
without significantly increasing litigation costs, thus obviating the
need for contribution, claim reduction, or ITDR.
B. Prescriptions
1. Detrebling and Claim Reduction
Senate Bill 539 introduced in Congress in 1987 as the Anti-
trust Amendments Act of 1987286 provides for mandatory trebling
in cases involving overcharges and undercharges and for claim re-
duction in all cases.287 The Bill essentially confines treble damage
claims to suits brought in the context of a supplier-customer rela-
tionship and, as a practical matter, limits trebling to price-fixing
suits. Trebling is eliminated in suits between rivals. 28 8 A three-
pronged rationale exists for this approach. First, the measure of
285. See S. 2162, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
286. S. 539, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). An identical bill has been introduced into
the House of Representatives. See H.R. 1155, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
287. The detrebling provisions of S. 539 and H.R. 1155 are substantially identical to
those of S. 2162.
288. S. 539, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 1155, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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damages in rivals' suits is normally lost profits, not overcharges.
Attempts to measure lost profits, particularly when the victim is a
relative newcomer to the field, are speculative."' Second, rivals'
suits may be brought for anticompetitive purposes, such as to
lessen the intensity of future competition 290 or to challenge poten-
tially procompetitive behavior.29' Suits by competitors may raise
defendants' costs and weaken their competitive ability. Detrebling
would lessen the incentives for rivals to prosecute baseless suits.
Third, when the alleged violation is committed by a rival, prospec-
tive plaintiffs are likely to be aware of the misconduct.292 Because
the conduct is not concealed, the chances of detection are much
greater, and the incentive provided by mandatory trebling is
unnecessary. "
In addition, the Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act of 1987294
contains a claim reduction proposal applicable to all antitrust
cases.2 5 The Bill permits the deduction from plaintiff's claims the
greatest of either: the amount stipulated in the settlement agree-
ment; the amount actually paid in settlement; or the actual dam-
ages (trebled when treble damages apply) fairly allocable to the
settling defendant. 29 The amount fairly allocable to the settling
defendant in overcharge cases would be determined by the defend-
ant's share of overcharges.297 In all other cases, the defendant's fair
share would be determined by its relative responsibility unless the
court determines that a sales-based allocation is more equitable.
Standing alone, without detrebling, the claim reduction propo-
sal has considerable merit, even though claim reduction alone
tends to reduce deterrence. 298 However, a claim reduction proposal
combined with a detrebling feature greatly reduces the deterrent
effect of private suits, which alters the balance of power between
plaintiffs and defendants. This combination seriously threatens
private antitrust enforcement. The Bill would impair deterrence of
289. Antitrust Remedies Reform: Hearings on S. 2162 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (statement of Douglas H. Ginsburg); Easterbrook,
supra note 188, at 462.
290. Austin, supra note 281, at 1363-66.
291. Easterbrook, supra note 188, at 461.
292. Id. at 458-60.
293. Id.




298. See supra notes 260-68 and accompanying text.
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certain pernicious anticompetitive conduct that does not result in
overcharges, such as group boycotts and predatory acts aimed at
driving a rival from the field. This conduct may involve specific
intent to violate the law with little, if any, procompetitive poten-
tial. It is not appropriate to detreble violations merely because
they are open and notorious; serious harm may still be inflicted by
the unconcealed anticompetitive conduct. 9 Furthermore, a rule of
actual damages combined with claim reduction reduces the plain-
tiffs' incentives to prosecute violations.300
The proposal would reduce unfair whipsaw settlement tactics.
Nevertheless, the more equitable treatment of defendants may be
unfair for plaintiffs. Lost profits, long recognized as an element of
damages in business torts,301 cannot be trebled under this Bill. The
mere fact that lost profits may be difficult to calculate in some
cases is no reason for detrebling. Plaintiffs ought not to be penal-
ized because the difficulty in measuring damages has been created
by defendants' own misconduct.302 Even if, on the whole, the com-
bination of selective detrebling and claim reduction is fairer to de-
fendants, the price paid is too high.
2. Discretionary Detrebling with a Liability Limitation
A more effective approach to resolving the problems of the
present system of antitrust damage allocation would be to permit
trebling only at the discretion of the court. The factors that the
court would take into account in exercising discretion might
include:
303
1. the willfulness of the violation;
2. whether a reasonably well-informed person should have
known that the conduct was illegal;
3. whether the illegal restraint gave rise to some societal ben-
efit or whether it was the kind of naked restraint of trade
299. See, e.g., American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
300. To the extent conduct is open and notorious, however, plaintiffs' incentive to de-
tect and prosecute violations is probably not significantly affected by a rule of actual dam-
ages combined with claim reduction.
301. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 28, § 130. But see Breit & Elzinga, supra
note 8, at 418 (stating that "[tihe measurement of damages caused by an antitrust violation
is more complicated than the measurement in many torts cases because the damage to prop-
erty is not physical and does not occur instantaneously. Moreover, during the time of injury,
the plaintiff must seek to mitigate damages").
302. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946); Story Parchment
Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
303. See Cavanagh, supra note 22, at 838-41.
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which traditionally has been condemned by the per se
rule;
4. the length of time the illegal acts were committed;
5. whether the conduct was engaged in openly or whether ef-
forts were made to keep the conduct secret;
6. the scope of the illegal activity;
7. the benefits derived by the defendants from the illegal ac-
tivity; and
8. the impact of increased damages on defendant's business.
Violations involving naked restraints of trade would give rise
to a presumption of trebling. Similarly, misconduct evaluated
under a rule of reason standard would presumptively involve only
actual damages. The discretionary factors come into play in two
key instances. First, the factors may be used in cases that do not
neatly fall into the per se or rule of reason classifications. Second,
the factors may be considered to rebut the presumptions of treb-
ling of actual damages. For example, in a case such as BMI,304
which on one level resembles a classic price-fixing agreement, but
on another level is an efficiency-enhancing activity, trebling would
not be appropriate. On the other hand, in cases such as NCAA,30 5
in which the rule of reason governs but the impact of the arrange-
ment is like that of a classic cartel, multiple damages may be
appropriate.
Discretionary detrebling would preserve joint and several lia-
bility and obviate the need for contribution, claim reduction, or
ITDR. Unlike the foregoing alternatives and the pending legisla-
tive proposal discussed above, this approach would not adversely
affect the deterrent function of the private damage action; deter-
rence would be fine-tuned. Egregious violations, such as horizontal
conspiracies affecting price and concerted predatory acts still
would be punishable by treble damages. Overdeterrence would be
avoided because conduct likely to have significant procompetitive
benefits would be subject only to actual damages. The discretion-
ary approach, even with the presumptions discussed may create
some uncertainty. However, added uncertainty is likely to increase
rather than to reduce the deterrent effect.
Discretionary detrebling alone, nevertheless, is problematic on
the issue of fairness. Whipsaw settlements would still be possible
304. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).




in price-fixing cases, and the very evils that arose in In re Corru-
gated Container Antitrust Litigation,30 6 which gave impetus to the
movement for contribution, could recur. This problem could be
mitigated, however, by adopting a ceiling on the liability of margi-
nal defendants in treble damage cases.30 7 Marginal defendants
would not be held jointly and severally liable for all damages. This
approach raises two immediate issues: the definition of a "marginal
defendant" and the amount of the ceiling.
Developing a hard-and-fast definition of a "marginal defend-
ant" is difficult. In cases involving overcharges, the degree of par-
ticipation ordinarily can be determined by sales. In cases in which
sales-based formulas are not appropriate, degree of participation
can be determined by relative fault. Two approaches might be con-
sidered. One would define "marginal" as a seller with less than ten
percent of sales or relative fault; the other would set the threshold
at five percent. A ten percent threshold would assure that only the
more culpable actors face joint and several liability. Conspirators
with at least ten percent of sales derive significant benefits from
the illicit scheme and thus have a vested interest in sustaining the
cartel. As sales shares dip below ten percent, the seller's interest in
the conspiracy becomes less vested, and the seller becomes more of
a follower than a leader. Drawing the line at ten percent theoreti-
cally would permit ten equally culpable defendants to escape joint
and several liability, but the probability of this actually occurring
is remote, particularly when one considers the tendency of conspir-
ators to cheat on one another. Thus, the risk that a moving force in
the conspiracy will avoid joint and several liability under a ten per-
cent test is low.
A five percent threshold, on the other hand, would save only
those on the outer periphery of the conspiracy from joint and sev-
eral liability. As a practical matter, a five percent test may be too
stringent to provide meaningful relief from the perceived evils of
the present system. Relatively minor actors with sales in the five to
ten percent range would remain subject to joint and several liabil-
ity. Moreover, as the degree of participation in an illegal scheme
declines, it becomes more difficult to draw a rational distinction
306. In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litig., 756 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1985).
307. This proposal for limited abolition of joint and several liability is borrowed from
recently enacted article 16 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. This law provides
for partial repeal of joint and several liability for noneconomic elements of personal injury
damages whether the alleged tortfeasor is 50% or less responsible for the injury. N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. L. & R. § 1601 (McKinney Supp. 1987).
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between sales levels that fall within the unprotected range and
those that fall within the safe haven. For example, the difference in
culpability of a defendant with four and one-half percent of sales
and one with five and one-half percent is arguably de minimis, but
the former is protected while the latter remains subject to joint
and several liability.
Both the ten percent test and the five percent test may be
criticized as arbitrary, but this is not a sufficient basis for their
condemnation. Bright-line rules always contain some degree of ar-
bitrariness3 08 These rules are justified when their benefits, such as
administrative efficiency, ease of application, and predictability,
outweigh any negative effects on antitrust enforcement. Here, ei-
ther the five percent or ten percent threshold would provide an
efficient, straightforward means of damage allocation.
The second concern is the amount of the ceiling. One ap-
proach is to limit a marginal defendant's liability to damages based
on its own sales, trebled when appropriate. In effect, this approach
adopts ITDR for marginal defendants. Alternatively, the ceiling
might be set higher, perhaps double the overcharges based on
sales, subject to trebling in appropriate cases. This would permit
the plaintiff a degree of leeway that exists under joint and several
liability but also would offer the defendant a clearly defined cap on
damages. The second alternative is more desirable than the first in
its provision of maximum flexibility for the plaintiff.
An approach that features discretionary trebling and a limited
repeal of joint and several liability for marginal defendants is
likely to add to the costs of litigation by increasing the length of
trial and the scope of discovery. The courts will face new issues
concerning the appropriateness of trebling and determining margi-
nal participation in the conspiracy. The latter issue is no more
complicated than the determination of relative fault under contri-
bution claim reduction and ITDR. New issues are almost certain to
be interjected into the lawsuit by the application of the discretion-
ary factors. The impact on the judicial process, however, may be
minimized by using the presumptive approach discussed above309
and through the court's power to limit discovery3 10 and proof at
trial so as to prevent the litigation from becoming unmanage-
308. United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
309. See supra notes 303-05 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 199-200.
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able."' At the same time, introduction of the discretionary factors
encourages delay and tactical maneuvering. Thus, the proposed ap-
proach has its costs, but the price may be very well worth paying
for a system that achieves a fair result without sacrificing
deterrence.
V. CONCLUSION
The question of reform in the present system of antitrust
damage allocation raises enormously complex issues. Given the
competing and interrelated goals of antitrust enforcement, any
change in the status quo is likely to have far-reaching and unpre-
dictable effects on deterrence. The present rule of no contribution
may promote whipsaw settlement tactics and in some cases may
produce unfair results, but instances in which the problems have
occurred are not sufficiently widespread to justify the adoption of
contribution principles. If treble damages are to be retained, claim
reduction is a less intrusive and hence preferable approach to dam-
age allocation.
On the other hand, if the problem of reform in damage alloca-
tion is to be considered in the context of overall reform in private
antitrust remedies, both claim reduction and contribution should
be rejected. The preferred approach would be to permit detrebling
at the courts' discretion combined with a limitation on joint and
several liability for marginal defendants. This proposal eliminates
unfairness without weakening deterrence. Claim reduction without
detrebling, although perhaps a second best approach, offers a far
less desirable alternative.
311. Id.
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